| LECTURE#22 |
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What do we mean by The Khrushov Thaw? The soviet society after the war. The Iron Curtain & the Cold War. Yugoslavia breaking free from Moscow (1948). The creation of NATO (1949). The Korean War (1950 1953). The Kremlin doctors trial. The death of the dictator (6 March 1953). Khrushov, Malenkov, Beria the struggle for power. The Warsaw Pact (1955). The 20th Party Congress: the Secret Speech & rehabilitations. Khrushov, helped by Zhukov wins against Stalinist hard-liners. Khrushovs internal & international policy, foreign relations. The Caribbean crisis (1962).
The Cold War _____________ Soviet expansion and domination in Eastern Europe Soviet attempts of consolidation and domination in Eastern Europe were in line with the older policies of the Russian Empire. Gaining the territories of interwar Poland, which was not initially achieved militarily and the Baltic States, through the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviets refused to cede any in post-WWII arrangements. Additionally, the country expanded into the territories of East Prussia (Kaliningrad Oblast), Transcarpathia attached to the Ukrainian SSR as Zakarpattia Oblast from Slovakia) and Ukrainian populated Northern Bukovina (as Chernivtsi Oblast through a 1947 treaty forced upon the Communist Romania). In the post-war aftermath, the Soviet Union viewed the territories of countries liberated from Nazism by the Soviet Army as its natural sphere of influence. Hardline pro-Soviet communist regimes were installed in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, often against the will of those country populations expressed in the popular elections. The idea that these actions were necessary to secure Soviet western border was viewed in the west as hypocritical. It was rather viewed as an attempt to spread Communism and pro-Soviet governments throughout Europe. The tenor of Soviet-U.S. relations The wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union was an aberration from the normal tenor of Russian-U.S. relations. Strategic rivalry between the huge, sprawling nations goes back to the 1890s when, after a century of friendship, Americans and Russians became rivals over the development of Manchuria. Tsarist Russia, unable to compete industrially, sought to close off and colonize parts of East Asia, while Americans demanded open competition for markets. In 1917 the rivalry turned intensely ideological. Americans never forgot that the Soviet government negotiated a separate peace with Germany in the First World War in 1917, leaving the Western Allies to fight the Central Powers alone. Lasting Russian mistrust stemmed from the landing of U.S. troops in Soviet Russia in 1918, which became involved, directly and indirectly, in assisting the anti-Bolshevik Whites in the civil war. In addition, the Soviets never forgot their requests that the United States and Britain open a second front on the European continent; but the Allied invasion did not occur until June 1944, more than two years after the Soviets had demanded it. In the meantime, the Russians suffered horrendous casualties, as high as twenty million dead, and the Soviets were forced to withstand the brunt of German strength. The allies claimed that a second front had been opened in 1943 in Italy and were not prepared to immediately assault Nazi-occupied France. The breakdown of postwar peace When the war ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Soviet and Western (US, British, and French) troops were essentially facing each other along a line down the center of Europe ranging from Lubeck to Triest. Aside from a few minor adjustments, this would be the "iron curtain" of the Cold War. In hindsight, Yalta signified the agreement of both sides that they could stay there and that neither side would use force to push the other out. This tacit accord applied to Asia as well, as evinced by U.S. occupation of Japan and the division of Korea. Politically, therefore, Yalta was an agreement on the postwar status quo in which Soviet Union hegemony reigned over about one third and the United States over two thirds. The Soviets were able to use a well organized ring of spies in the United States, to gain critical advantages during meetings with representatives of Britain and the United States. Several of FDRs advisors and cabinet members regularly reported their activities to NKVD handlers. There were fundamental contrasts between the visions of the United States and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and socialism. And those contrasts had been simplified and refined in national ideologies to represent two ways of life, each vindicated in 1945 by previous disasters. Conflicting models of autarchy versus exports, of state planning against free enterprise, were to vie for the allegiance of the developing and developed world in the postwar years. Even so, however, the Cold War was not obviously inevitable in 1945. Despite the wherewithal of the United States to advance a different vision of postwar Europe, Stalin viewed the reemergence of Germany and Japan as Russia''s chief threats, not the United States. At the time, the prospects of an Anglo-American front against the USSR seemed slim from Stalin''s standpoint. Economic advisers such as Eugen Varga reinforced this view, predicting a postwar crisis of overproduction in capitalist countries which would culminate by 1947-1948 in another great depression. For one, Stalin assumed that the capitalist camp would soon resume its internal rivalry over colonies and trade and not pose a threat to Russia. Varga''s analysis was partly based on trends in U.S. federal expenditures. Due to the war effort mostly, in the first peacetime year of 1946, federal spending still amounted to $62 billion, or 30% of GDP, up from 3% of GDP in 1929, before the Great Depression, New Deal, and Second World War. Thus, Stalin assumed that the Americans would need to look to Russia, to maintain the same level of exports and state expenditures. However, there would be no postwar crisis of overproduction. And, as Varga anticipated, the U.S. maintained a roughly comparable level of government spending in the postwar era. It was just maintained in a vastly different way. In the end, the postwar U.S. government would look a lot like the wartime government, with the military establishment, along with military-security, accounting for a significant share of federal expenditures. Two visions of the world The United States, however, led by President Harry S. Truman since April 1945, was determined to shape the postwar world to open up the world''s markets to capitalist trade according to the principles laid down by the Atlantic Charter: self-determination, equal economic access, and a rebuilt capitalist democratic Europe that could again serve as a hub in world affairs. Franklin D. Roosevelt had never forgotten the excitement with which he had greeted the principles of Wilsonian idealism during World War I, and he saw his mission in the 1940s as bringing lasting peace and genuine democracy to the world. But this vision was equally a vision of national self-interest. World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The only major industrial power in the world to emerge intactand even greatly strengthened from an economic perspectivewas the United States, which moved swiftly to consolidate its position. As the world''s greatest industrial power, and as one of the few nations unravaged by the war, the United States stood to gain more than any other country from opening up a global market for its exports and access to vital raw materials. The beginning of the Cold War Truman could advance these principles with an economic powerhouse that produced 50 percent of the world''s industrial goods and a vast military power that rested on a monopoly of the new atomic bomb. Such a power could mold and benefit from a recovering Europe, which in turn required a healthy Germany at its center; these aims were at the center of what the Soviet Union strove to avoid as the breakdown of the wartime alliance went forward. The wherewithal of the United States to advance a different vision of the postwar world conflicted with Soviet interests. National security had been the real cornerstone of Soviet policy since the 1920s, when the Communist Party adopted Stalin''s "socialism in one country" and rejected Trotsky''s ideas of "world revolution." Before the war, Stalin did not attempt to push Soviet boundaries beyond their full Tsarist extent. In this sense, the aims of the Soviet Union may not have been aggressive expansionison but rather consolidation, i.e. attempting to secure the war-torn country''s western borders. Stalin, assuming that Japan and Germany could menace the Soviet Union once again by the 1960s, thus quickly imposed Moscow-dominated governments in the springboards of the Nazi onslaught: Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Many others, however, viewed these moves as an aggressive attempt to expand communism and generally viewed the Soviet perception with skepticism. Disagreements over postwar plans first centered on Eastern and Central Europe. Having lost 20 million dead in the war, suffered German and Nazi German invasion, and suffered tens of millions of casualties due to onslaughts from the West three times in the preceding 150 years, first with Napoleon, the Soviet Union was determined to destroy Germany''s capacity for another war by keeping it under tight control. U.S. aims were quite opposed, since they would require a democratic restored Germany as a trade and perhaps military partner. Winston Churchill, long a visceral anti-Communist, condemned Stalin for cordoning off a new Russian empire with an "iron curtain." Afterwards, Truman finally refused to give the war-torn Soviet Union "reparations" from West Germany''s industrial plants, Stalin retaliated by sealing off East Germany as a Communist state. Russia''s historic lack of maritime access, a perennial concern of Russian foreign policy well before the Bolshevik Revolution, was also a focus for Russia, yet another area where interests diverged between East and West. Stalin pressed the Turks for improved access out of the Black Sea through Turkey''s Dardanelles Strait, which would allow Soviet passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Churchill had earlier recognized Stalin''s claims, but now the British and Americans forced the Soviet Union to pull back. But when the Soviet leadership did not perceive the country''s security was at stake, the policies were more measured: the Soviet Union eventually withdrew from Northern Iran, at Anglo-American behest; Stalin did observe his 1944 agreement with Churchill and did not aid the communists in the struggle against government in Greece; in Finland he accepted a friendly, noncommunist government; and Russian troops were withdrawn from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1945. However, a communist coup in Prague in 1948 made Czecholovakia an effective Soviet satellite soon afterwords and until the end of the Cold War. "Containment" and the Marshall Plan While the Soviet Union acquiesced to Anglo-American designs to impede Soviet access to the Mediterranean (a perennial focus of British foreign policy since the Crimean War in the 1850s), the United States heated up its rhetoric; what began as Anglo-American efforts to support the Greek government became a struggle to protect the "free" peoples against "totalitarian" regimes. This would be articulated in the Truman Doctrine Speech of March 1947, which declared that the United States would spend as much as $400 million in efforts to "contain" communism. By successfully aiding Greece, Truman also set a precedent for the U.S. aid to anticommunist regimes worldwide, even authoritarian ones at times. U.S. foreign policy moved into alignment with State Department officer George Kennan''s argument that the Soviets had to be "contained" using "unalterable counterforce at every point," until the breakdown of Soviet power occurred. The United States launched massive economic reconstruction efforts, first in Western Europe and then in Japan (as well as in South Korea and Taiwan). The Marshall Plan began to pump $12 billion into Western Europe. The rationale was that economically stable nations were less likely to fall prey to Soviet influence, a view which was vindicated in the long run. In response Stalin blockaded Berlin, which was deep within the Soviet zone although subject to the control of all four major powers. The Soviets cut off all rail and road routes to West Berlin. Convinced that he could starve and freeze West Berlin into submission, no trucks or trains were allowed entry into the city. However, this decision backfired when Truman embarked on a highly visible move that would humiliate the Soviets internationally--supplying the beleaguered city by air. Military confrontation threatened while Truman, with British help, flew supplies over East Germany into West Berlin during the 1948-1949 blockade. This costly aerial supplying of West Berlin became known as the Berlin Airlift. Truman joined eleven other nations in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United States'' first "entangling" European alliance in 170 years. Stalin replied to these moves by integrating the economies of Eastern Europe in his version of the Marshall Plan, exploding the first Soviet atomic device in 1949, signing an alliance with Communist China in February 1950, and forming the Warsaw Pact, Eastern Europe''s counterpart to NATO. U.S. officials quickly moved to escalate and expand "containment." In a secret 1950 document, NSC-68, they proposed to strengthen their alliance systems, quadruple defense spending, and embark on an elaborate propaganda campaign to convince Americans to fight this costly cold war. Truman ordered the development of a hydrogen bomb; in early 1950 the U.S. embarked on its first attempt to prop up colonialism in French Indochina in the face of mounting popular, communist-led resistance; and the United States embarked on what the Soviets considered a blatant violation of wartime treaties: plans to form a West German army. The immediate post-1945 period may have been the historical high point for the popularity of communist ideology. Communist parties won large shares of the vote in free elections in countries such as Belgium, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and Finland; and won significant popular support in Asia (Vietnam, India, and Japan) and throughout Latin America. In addition they won large support in China, Greece, and Iran, where free elections remained absent or constrained but where Communist parties enjoyed widespread appeal. In response, the United States sustained a massive anticommunist ideological offensive. The United States aimed to "contain" communism through both aggressive diplomacy and interventionist policies. In retrospect, this initiative appears largely successful: Washington brandished its role as the leader of the "free world" at least as effectively as the Soviet Union brandished its position as the leader of the "progressive" and "anti-imperialist" camp. Korean War In 1950 the Soviet Union protested against the fact that the Chinese seat at the UN Security Council was held by the (Nationalist controlled) Republic of China, and boycotted the meetings. It came to regret this decision when the Korean War started. The UN passed a resolution condemning North Korean actions and offering military support to South Korea. Had the Soviet Union been present at the meetings it would certainly have vetoed the outcome. After this incident the Soviet Union was never absent at the meetings of the Security Council. ________________________________________________________________________ De-Stalinization and the Khrushchev era After Stalin had died in March 1953, he was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Georgi Malenkov as Premier of the Soviet Union. The new leadership declared an amnesty for some serving prison sentences for criminal offences, announced price cuts, and relaxed the restrictions on private plots. De-Stalinization also spelled an end to the role of large-scale forced labor in the economy. During a period of collective leadership, Khrushchev gradually consolidated power. At a speech "On the Personality Cult and its Consequences'''' to the closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, February 25, 1956, Khrushchev shocked his listeners by denouncing Stalin''s dictatorial rule and cult of personality. He also attacked the crimes committed by Stalin''s closest associates. On April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. Here, a crowd in Red Square listens to him speak. The impact on Soviet politics was immense. The speech stripped the legitimacy of his remaining Stalinist rivals, dramatically boosting his power domestically. Afterwards, Khrushchev eased restrictions, freeing millions of political prisoners (the GULAG population declined from 13 million in 1953 to 5 million in 1956-57) and initiating economic policies that emphasized commercial goods rather than coal and steel production, allowing living standards to rise dramatically and at the same time having high levels of economic growth. Such loosening of controls also caused an enormous impact on its satellites in Central Europe, many of whom resentful of Soviet influence in their affairs. Riots broke out in Poland in the summer of 1956, facing reprisals from local forces. A political convulsion soon followed, leading to the rise of Wadysaw Gomuka to power in October. This almost triggered a Soviet invasion due to the fact that Polish Communists elected him without consulting the Kremlin in advance. But Khrushchev backed down due to Gomuka''s widespread popularity in the country. Poland would still remain a member of the Warsaw Pact (established a year earlier), and in return, the Soviet Union intervened less frequently on its neighbours'' domestic and external affairs. In the same year, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was brutally suppressed by Soviet troops. About 25-50,000 Hungarian insurgents and 7,000 Soviet troops were killed, thousands more were wounded, and nearly a quarter million left the country as refugees. The revolution was a blow to the Communists in Western countries; many who had formerly supported the Soviet Union now criticized it. The following year Khrushchev defeated a concerted Stalinist attempt to recapture power, decisively defeating the so-called "Anti-Party Group". This event also illustrated the new nature of Soviet politicsthe most decisive attack on the Stalinists was delivered by defense minister Georgy Zhukov, and the implied threat to the plotters was clear; however, none of the "anti-party group" were killed: for instance, one was posted to manage a power station in the Caucasus, and another, Vyacheslav Molotov, became ambassador to Mongolia. Khrushchev became Premier on March 27, 1958 after a long and complex series of maneuvers, notably the crucial removal of Stalin''s obvious successor, Lavrenty Beria, head of the NKVD (as the secret police were then known). The ten-year period that followed Stalin''s death also witnessed the reassertion of political power over the means of coercion. The party became the dominant institution over the secret police and army. Aid to developing countries and scientific research, especially into space technology and weaponry, maintained the Soviet Union as one of the world''s two major world powers. The Soviets sent up the first-ever artificial earth satellite in history, Sputnik, which orbited the earth in 1957. The Soviets also sent the first man into space, Yuri Gagarin in 1961. Khrushchev outmaneuvered his Stalinist rivals. But he was regarded by his political enemies - especially the emerging caste of professional technocrats - as a boorish peasant who would interrupt speakers to insult them. Khrushchev''s reforms and fall Throughout his years of leadership, Khrushchev attempted to carry out reform in a range of fields. The problems of Soviet agriculture, a major concern of Khrushchev''s, had earlier attracted the attention of the collective leadership, which introduced important innovations in this area of the Soviet economy. The state encouraged peasants to grow more on their private plots, increased payments for crops grown on collective farms, and invested more heavily in agriculture. In his Virgin Lands Campaign in the mid-1950s, Khrushchev opened many tracts of land to farming in Kazakhstan and neighboring areas of Russia. These new farmlands turned out to be susceptible to droughts, but in some years they produced excellent harvests. Later agricultural reforms by Khrushchev, however, proved counterproductive. His plans for growing corn and increasing meat and dairy production failed, and his reorganization of collective farms into larger units produced confusion in the countryside. Khrushchev''s attempts at reform in industry and administrative organization created even greater problems. In a politically motivated move to weaken the central state bureaucracy, in 1957 Khrushchev did away with the industrial ministries in Moscow and replaced them with regional economic councils (sovnarkhozes). Although he intended these economic councils to be more responsive to local needs, the decentralization of industry led to disruption and inefficiency. Connected with this decentralization was Khrushchev''s decision in 1962 to recast party organizations along economic, rather than administrative, lines. The resulting bifurcation of the party apparatus into industrial and agricultural sectors at the oblast (province) level and below contributed to the disarray and alienated many party officials at all levels. Symptomatic of the country''s economic difficulties was the abandonment in 1963 of Khrushchev''s special seven-year economic plan (1959-65) two years short of its completion. By 1964 Khrushchev''s prestige had been damaged in a number of areas. Industrial growth had slowed, while agriculture showed no new progress. Abroad, the split with China, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis hurt the Soviet Union''s international stature, and Khrushchev''s efforts to improve relations with the West antagonized many in the military. Lastly, the 1962 party reorganization caused turmoil throughout the Soviet political chain of command. In military policy Khrushchev relentlessly pursued a policy of developing the Soviet Union''s missile forces with a view to reducing the size of the armed forces, thus freeing more young men for productive labour and releasing resources to develop the economy, especially consumer goods, more generally. This policy too proved personally disastrous, alienating key figures in the Soviet military establishment and culminating in the fiasco (in Soviet eyes) of the Cuban missile crisis. Despite large reductions in Soviet military forces, there was only a slight thawing in relations with the West as Europe''s Iron Curtain remained fortified. Khrushchev''s boasts about Soviet missile forces provided John F. Kennedy with a key issue to use against Richard Nixon in the 1960 U.S. presidential electionthe so-called ''Missile gap''. But all Khrushchev''s (probably sincere) attempts to build a strong personal relationship with the new president failed, as his typical combination of bluster, miscalculation and mishap resulted in the Cuban fiasco. In October 1964, while Khrushchev was vacationing in Crimea, the Presidium voted him out of office and refused to permit him to take his case to the Central Committee. Khrushchev retired as a private citizen after his successors denounced him for his "hare-brained schemes, half-baked conclusions, and hasty decisions." However, Khrushchev must also be remembered for his public disavowal of Stalinism, significant liberalization in the country, and the greater flexibility he brought to Soviet leadership. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Soviet_Union_%281953-1985%29 ________________________________________________________________________ Soviet atomic bomb project The beginnings Joseph Stalin was first informed of American nuclear research because of a letter sent to him in April 1942 by Georgii Flerov, who pointed out that nothing was being published in the physics journals by Americans, British, or Germans, on nuclear fission since the year of its discovery, 1939, and that indeed many of the most prominent physicists in Allied countries seemed not to be publishing at all. This nonevent was very suspicious, and accordingly Flerov urged Stalin to start a program. However, because the Soviet Union was still involved with the war with Germany on its home front, a large scale domestic effort could not yet be undertaken. Administration and personnel The administrative head of the project was Stalin''s former chief of security Lavrentii Beria, and its scientific head was the physicist Igor Kurchatov. The project started outside Moscow and later moved to the village of Sarov, which then disappeared from the maps for forty-five years. Other important figures were Yuli Khariton and the future dissident and lead theoretical designer of their hydrogen bomb, Andrei Sakharov. Espionage The project had the benefit of much espionage information gathered from the Manhattan Project in the United States and United Kingdom (which the Russians had code-named Enormoz) by the spies Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, among others. However, the information was not shared freely among the project''s scientists, and was used by Beria as a "check" on the accuracy of the scientists. After the United States used its atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945, and published the Smyth Report outlining the basics of their wartime program, Beria had the scientists duplicate the American process as closely as possible in terms of development of resources and factories. The reason was expedience: the goal was to produce a working weapon as soon as possible, and after Hiroshima and Nagasaki they knew that the American design would work. Beria largely distrusted the scientists working under him, which was why he rarely gave them direct access to intelligence information after 1945. He was fond of having multiple teams of scientists working on the same problems, who would only find out the existence of the other team of scientists when they were brought together before Beria to explain the differences in their results with one another. Though Beria was not the chief of security at this time, his reputation for ruthlessness was always present, and the Soviet atomic bomb project received status as the highest priority of national security after 1945. Scholar Alexei Kojevnikov has estimated, based on newly released Soviet documents, that the primary way in which the espionage may have sped up the Soviet project was that it allowed Khariton to avoid dangerous tests to determine the size of the critical mass ("tickling the dragon''s tail," as they were called in the U.S., which consumed a good deal of time and claimed at least two lives). Logistical problems the Soviets faced The single largest problem during the early Soviet project was the procurement of uranium ore, as it had no known domestic sources at the beginning of the project. The first Soviet nuclear reactor was fueled using uranium confiscated from the remains of the German atomic bomb project. Eventually, however, large domestic sources were found, and mined using penal labor. Important Soviet nuclear tests First Lightning The first Soviet atomic test was First Lightning on August 29, 1949, and was code-named by the Americans as Joe 1. It was a replica of the American Fat Man bomb whose design the Soviets knew from espionage. Joe Four The first Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb was on August 12, 1953 and was nicknamed Joe 4 by the Americans; it was not a "true" fusion bomb (it was more like a "boosted" fission bomb than a staged thermonuclear device, and had a yield comparable to large fission weapons; around 90% of its yield was directly or indirectly from fission). The first Soviet test of a "true" hydrogen bomb in the megaton range was on November 22, 1955. It was dubbed RDS-37 by the Soviets. It was of the multi-staged, radiation implosion thermonuclear design called Sakharov''s "Third Idea" in the USSR and the Teller-Ulam design in the USA. Joe 1, Joe 4, and RDS-37 were all tested at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan. The Tsar Bomba was the biggest nuclear bomb ever built by anyone, and was a fusion bomb with a yield of ~50 megatons. It was detonated on October 30, 1961, and was capable of approximately 100 megatons, but was purposely reduced shortly before the launch. It was not a realistic weapon of war, but was part of sabre-rattling between the Soviet Union and United States during the Cold War. It was hot enough to induce third degree burns at 100 km. The test was conducted at Site C on Novaya Zemlya Island in the Arctic Sea. Chagan Chagan was shot in the Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy or Project 7, the Soviet equivalent of the US Operation Plowshare to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear weapons. It was an underground test, and was fired on January 15, 1965. The site was a dry bed of the Chagan River at the edge of the Semipalatinsk Test Site, and was chosen such that the lip of the crater would dam the river during its high spring flow. The resultant crater had a diameter of 408 meters and was 100 meters deep. A major lake (10,000,000 m3) soon formed behind the 20-35 m high upraised lip, known as Lake Chagan or Lake Balapan. The area is still radioactive (as of 2005). The test apparently violated the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the United States complained to the Soviets, but the matter was dropped. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project _______________________________________________________________________ NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV Nikita Khrushchev, the grandson of a serf and the son of a coal miner, was born in Kalinovka, Ukraine on 5th April, 1894. After a brief formal education Khrushchev found work as a pipe fitter in Yuzovka. During the First World War Khrushchev became involved in trade union activities and after the October Revolution joined the Bolsheviks. In January, 1919, Khrushchev joined the Red Army and fought against the Whites in the Ukraine during the Civil War. After leaving the army he returned to Yuzovka where he returned to school to finish his education. Khrushchev remained active in the Communist Party and in 1925 was employed as party secretary of the Petrovsko-Mariinsk. Lazar Kaganovich, the general-secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was impressed with Khrushchev and invited him to accompany him to the 14th Party Congress in Moscow. With the support of Kaganovich, Khrushchev made steady progress in the party hierarchy. In 1938 Khrushchev became secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and was employed by Joseph Stalin to carry out the Great Purge in the Ukraine. The following year he became a full member of the Politburo. After the invasion of Poland in 1940 Khrushchev was given the responsibility of suppressing the Polish and Ukrainian nationalists. When the German Army invaded the Soviet Union in June, 1941, Khrushchev arranged the evacuation of much of the region''s industry. During the Second World War Khrushchev granted the rank lieutenant general, and was given the task of organizing guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine against the Germans. When the German Army retreated in 1944 Khrushchev was once again placed in control of the Ukraine and the rebuilding of the region. Khrushchev job was made more difficult by the famine of 1946. This brought him into conflict with Joseph Stalin who accused Khrushchev of concentrating too much on feeding the people living of the Ukraine rather than exporting food to the rest of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was demoted in 1951 and replaced as the minister responsible for agriculture. On the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, Gregory Malenkov became both prime minister and head of the Communist Party. He appeared to be a reformer and called for a higher priority to be given to consumer goods. In September, 1953, Khrushchev became first secretary of the Communist Party. He arranged for the execution of Lavrenti Beria, head of the Secret Police and gradually he gained control of the party machinery. In 1955 he joined with Nikolai Bulganin to oust Gregory Malenkov from power. During the 20th Party Congress in February, 1956, Khrushchev launched an attack on the rule of Joseph Stalin. He condemned the Great Purge and accused Stalin of abusing his power. He announced a change in policy and gave orders for the Soviet Union''s political prisoners to be released. In the summer of 1956 Gregory Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich attempted to oust Khrushchev This was unsuccessful and Khrushchev now purged his opponents in the Communist Party. Khrushchev''s de-Stalinzation policy encouraged people living in Eastern Europe to believe that he was willing to give them more independence from the Soviet Union. In Hungary the prime minister Imre Nagy removed state control of the mass media and encouraged public discussion on political and economic reform. Nagy also released anti-communists from prison and talked about holding free elections and withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev became increasingly concerned about these developments and on 4th November 1956 he sent the Red Army into Hungary. During the Hungarian Uprising an estimated 20,000 people were killed. Nagy was arrested and replaced by the Soviet loyalist, Janos Kadar. Imre Nagy was imprisoned and executed in 1958. In 1958 Khrushchev replaced Gregory Malenkov as prime minister and was now the undisputed leader of both state and party. In the Soviet Union he promoted reform of the Soviet system and began to place an emphasis on the production of consumer goods rather than on heavy industry. Khrushchev eased censorship in the Soviet Union and allowed One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn to be published. Some pointed out that this was part of his de-Stalinization policy and did not reflect a genuine increase in freedom. His critics pointed out that books such as Doctor Zhivago by Boris Pasternak were still banned. In 1959 Khrushchev announced a change in foreign policy. In 1959 visited the United States and offered "the capitalist countries peaceful competition". Khrushchev was due to attend the Paris Summit Conference in 1960 when a reconnaissance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. He cancelled the meeting and later that year at the Union Nations he attacked Western influence in the Congo. When John F. Kennedy replaced Dwight Eisenhower as president of the United States he was told about the CIA plan to invade Cuba. Kennedy had doubts about the venture but he was afraid he would be seen as soft on communism if he refused permission for it to go ahead. Kennedy''s advisers convinced him that Castro was an unpopular leader and that once the invasion started the Cuban people would support the ClA-trained forces. On April 14, 1961, B-26 planes began bombing Cuba''s airfields. After the raids Cuba was left with only eight planes and seven pilots. Two days later five merchant ships carrying 1,400 Cuban exiles arrived at the Bay of Pigs. The attack was a total failure. Two of the ships were sunk, including the ship that was carrying most of the supplies. Two of the planes that were attempting to give air-cover were also shot down. Within seventy-two hours all the invading troops had been killed, wounded or had surrendered. At the beginning of September 1962, U-2 spy planes discovered that the Soviet Union was building surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch sites. There was also an increase in the number of Soviet ships arriving in Cuba which the United States government feared were carrying new supplies of weapons. President Kennedy complained to the Soviet Union about these developments and warned them that the United States would not accept offensive weapons (SAMs were considered to be defensive) in Cuba. On September 27, a CIA agent in Cuba overheard Castro''s personal pilot tell another man in a bar that Cuba now had nuclear weapons. U-2 spy-plane photographs also showed that unusual activity was taking place at San Cristobal. However, it was not until October 15 that photographs were taken that revealed that the Soviet Union was placing long range missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy''s first reaction to the information about the missiles in Cuba was to call a meeting to discuss what should be done. Fourteen men attended the meeting and included military leaders, experts on Latin America, representatives of the CIA, cabinet ministers and personal friends whose advice Kennedy valued. This group became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Over the next few days they were to meet several times. At the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, the CIA and other military advisers explained the situation. After hearing what they had to say, the general feeling of the meeting was for an air-attack on the missile sites. Remembering the poor advice the CIA had provided before the Bay of Pigs invasion, John F. Kennedy decided to wait and instead called for another meeting to take place that evening. By this time several of the men were having doubts about the wisdom of a bombing raid, fearing that it would lead to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The committee was now so divided that a firm decision could not be made. The Executive Committee of the National Security Council argued amongst themselves for the next two days. The CIA and the military were still in favour of a bombing raid and/or an invasion. However, the majority of the committee gradually began to favour a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy accepted their decision and instructed Theodore Sorensen, a member of the committee, to write a speech in which Kennedy would explain to the world why it was necessary to impose a naval blockade of Cuba. As well as imposing a naval blockade, Kennedy also told the air-force to prepare for attacks on Cuba and the Soviet Union. The army positioned 125,000 men in Florida and was told to wait for orders to invade Cuba. If the Soviet ships carrying weapons for Cuba did not turn back or refused to be searched, a war was likely to begin. Kennedy also promised his military advisers that if one of the U-2 spy planes were fired upon he would give orders for an attack on the Cuban SAM missile sites. The world waited anxiously. A public opinion poll in the United States revealed that three out of five people expected fighting to break out between the two sides. There were angry demonstrations outside the American Embassy in London as people protested about the possibility of nuclear war. Demonstrations also took place in other cities in Europe. However, in the United States, polls suggested that the vast majority supported Kennedy''s action. On October 24, President John F. Kennedy was informed that Soviet ships had stopped just before they reached the United States ships blockading Cuba. That evening Khrushchev sent an angry note to Kennedy accusing him of creating a crisis to help the Democratic Party win the forthcoming election. On October 26, Khrushchev sent Kennedy another letter. In this he proposed that the Soviet Union would be willing to remove the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a promise by the United States that they would not invade Cuba. The next day a second letter from Khrushchev arrived demanding that the United States remove their nuclear bases in Turkey. While the president and his advisers were analyzing Khrushchev''s two letters, news came through that a U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuba. The leaders of the military, reminding Kennedy of the promise he had made, argued that he should now give orders for the bombing of Cuba. Kennedy refused and instead sent a letter to Khrushchev accepting the terms of his first letter. Khrushchev agreed and gave orders for the missiles to be dismantled. Eight days later the elections for Congress took place. The Democrats increased their majority and it was estimated that Kennedy would now have an extra twelve supporters in Congress for his policies. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the first and only nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The event appeared to frighten both sides and it marked a change in the development of the Cold War. The Military and the leaders of the Communist Party felt humiliated by Khrushchev climbdown over Cuba. His agricultural policy was also a failure and the country was forced to import increasing amounts of wheat from Canada and the United States. On 14th October, 1964, the Central Committee forced Khrushchev to resign. He lived in retirement in Moscow where he wrote his memoirs, Khrushchev Remembers (1971). Nikita Khrushchev died on 11th September, 1971. Originally from : http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ __________________________________________ Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich __________________________________________ Timeline. 1894 Apr 17: Born in Kalinovka, Kursk Province, the child of peasants. 1909: Moves to Yuzovka (later Stalino, later Donetsk) in Donbas region, Ukraine. Father works in mine. 1909-12: Learns metal-fitter''s trade at Bosse factory in Yuzovka. 1912-18: Works as metal fitter in generator plants of Ruchenkov and Pastukhov mines. 1915: Becomes "avid reader of Pravda". 1917: Represents miners at political meetings. 1918: Becomes Bolshevik. 1919: Joins Red Army. 1919-1921: Soldier and Party Worker in Ninth Rifle Division, attached to Budyonny''s First Mounted Army. 1921: Death of first wife in famine. 1922: Back to Yuzovka from Front. 1922: Becomes deputy director of Ruchenkov mines. 1923: Student and political leader at Yuzovka Workers Faculty. 1924: Works in Yuzovka Party organization. 1924: Married Nina Petrovna. 1925: Appointed Party Secretary of Petrovsko-Marinsk District of Stalino (formerly Yuzovka) Region. 1925: Attends 9th Ukrainian Party Congress, chaired by Kaganovich. 1925: Nonvoting Delegate to 14th All-Union Party Congress, Moscow. 1926: First recorded public speech at Ukrainian Party Conference in Kharkov. 1927: Delegate to 15th All-Union Party Congress, Moscow. 1927: Promoted from Stalino District to Regional Party apparatus. 1928: Promoted by Kaganovich to Deputy Chief of Organizational Section of Ukrainian Central Committee in Kharkov. 1929-31: Student and Political worker at Stalin Industrial Academy in Moscow. Suslov is teacher in school. 1931: Elected First Secretary of Bauman District. 1931 Jan: Elected to Moscow City Party Committee. Head of committee is Kaganovich. 1931 Jul: Promoted to First Secretary of Red Presnya District; keeps Bauman District still in his hands. 1932 Jan: Second Secretary Moscow City Party Committee; second to Kaganovich. 1933: Second Secretary Moscow Regional Committee. 1933: Active in construction of the Moscow Metro. 1934: Made First Secretary of Moscow City Committee. 1934: Elected to Central Committee at 17th Party Congress (the "Congress of the Victors"). 1934 Dec: Following Kirov''s murder, accompanies Stalin to Leningrad as a member of the commission to arrange Kirov''s funeral. 1935: First Secretary Moscow City and Regional Committees. 1937: Appointed Candidate Member of Stalin''s Politburo. 1938 May: Appointed First Secretary of Ukrainian Central Committee. Upon election, he says "I pledge myself to spare no efforts in seizing and annihilating all agents of fascism, Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and all those despicable bourgeois nationalists on our free Ukrainian soil." 1939 Mar: Made Full Member of Politburo. 1939 Sep - 1940: Supervises occupation and sovietization of western (Polish) Ukraine. 1941-43: Commissar on various fronts with rank of lieutenant general; his eldest son dies in battle for Stalingrad. 1944: After liberation of Ukraine, he retains post as First Secretary of Ukraine and becomes Chairman of Ukrainian Soviet of Ministers. 1945: Goes to Warsaw as chairman of the commission of experts for city''s reconstruction. 1945: Meets Eisenhower in Moscow. 1946: Ukraine suffers worst drought since 1890. Agricultural disaster. Nikita in Trouble 1947 Mar, first week: Accused of insufficient vigilance in stamping out nationalist agitation in Ukraine and of slow pace in re-collectivizing Ukraine. Relieved of position of First Secretary of Ukraine, replaced by Kaganovich. N.S. Patolichev, a Malenkov man, made Second Secretary. (Khrushchev retains post as Chairman of Ukrainian Soviet and position on Politburo). Since end of war, Khrushchev had set up 504 collective farms. In next 10 months Kaganovich sets up another 1150. 1947 Mar 12: At meeting of Ukrainian Central Committee meeting, Khrushchev admits agricultural shortcomings, but blames them on his Minister of Agriculture. 1947 Mar 22: Removed from post as Secretary of Kiev Regional Party Committee. 1947 Mar 24: Removed from post as Secretary of Kiev City Party Committee. 1947 Jun: Absent from Ukrainian Central Committee meeting. Nikita Bounces Back 1948 Jan: Reinstated as First Secretary of Ukraine. Patolichev banished to Rostov-on-Don. 1949 Dec: Made head of Moscow Oblast and city committee and made Secretary of CC. Given control of agriculture. 1950: Amalgamates collective farms and pushes agro-town scheme; supports "brigade" system of agriculture. 1950 Jun: Announces that, as result of amalgamation, number of collective farms in Moscow oblast reduced from 6069 to 1668 1951 Feb 13: In Izvestia article from collective farm chairman criticizes amalgamation. He says result was that 112 households from 4 villages were uprooted and moved, at their own expense, to a fifth village where they had to build their own huts. 1951 Mar 4: Khrushchev publishes article in Pravda and other papers in support of his amalgamation plans. The next day, an "Editor''s Note" says plan is still "under discussion". 1951 Mar: Agro-town scheme rejected. Responsibility for agriculture transferred to Malenkov. 1952 Oct: At 19th Party Congress, Khrushchev delivers report on Party reorganization; Malenkov condemns Khrushchev''s previous agricultural policies without specifically naming him. Malenkov says: "The mistakes these comrades made was that they overlooked the major task of the collective farms--the business of production." 1952 Oct: At 19th Party Congress, Politburo is renamed the "Presidium" and expanded from 11 to 25 full members and 11 candidates, effectively diluting the power of Malenkov, Khrushchev, and the other senior members. 1953 Jan 13: "Doctors Plot" supposedly uncovered. 1953 Mar 6: Stalin dies. Announcement made at 6 A.M. The Presidium (Politburo) is immediately reduced back to 14 members. Among the upstarts kicked out are Brezhnev and Kosygin. 1953 Mar 14: Session of Supreme Soviet, expected to appoint Malenkov as First Secretary and Prime Minister, is cancelled. Instead, a Party plenum convenes. Malenkov "requests" to be relieved as First Secretary because of his duties as Prime Minister. Resignation accepted, no successor named. Khrushchev, however, listed first among secretaries. 1953 Jun 28: Beria arrested. 1953 Aug: Malenkov presents program for accelerated development of light and food industries to the Supreme Soviet first, bypassing the Party Central Committee. 1953 Sep: Khrushchev officially named First Secretary. Begins removing Malenkov men from key Party posts. 1953 Sep 15: Give speech frankly revealing many of the agricultural failures. 1953 Sep: Reduces taxes on individual plots. Taxes on cows and pigs eliminated. Prices paid to kolkhozes and sovkhoves raised. Begins Corn Campaign. 1953 Dec: Beria executed. 1954 Feb: Begins Virgin Lands campaign (bringing into cultivation 32 million acres of previously uncultivated land in Kazakhstan and southwestern Siberia). 1954 Feb-summer: Tours Soviet Union. 1954 Aug 17: Victory of Khrushchev''s "Party" group over Malenkov''s "technocrats" signaled by joint Party-government decree in which Party gets top billing for the first time since Stalin''s death. 1954 Oct: Goes to China. 1954 Oct: Issues first decree by himself only. (Decree concerning anti-religious propaganda). 1954 Dec 23: Former Minister of State Security Abakumov, a close Malenkov collaborator, executed for his part in the "Leningrad Affair" (purging of Zhdanov''s supporters which had been organized by Malenkov in 1948) 1955 Jan 24: Signs second personal decree. (moving Lenin''s anniversary to his birthday, not the day of his death) 1955 Feb 8: Malenkov forced to resign as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and accepts all blame for agricultural failings (although he himself never had anything to do with agriculture). Bulganin takes over the post. Khrushchev''s consolidation of power now complete. Malenkov remains on Presidium (Politburo). 1955 Apr 20: Pravda publishes article on "the collective nature of work", stressing that all members of the Politburo were equal. Party journal Kommunist also stresses this point. (Henceforth, no more decrees appear with only Khrushchev''s signature). 1955: Poor weather in virgin lands areas. Almost all spring wheat sown in virgin lands perishes. 1955 Jun: Visits Yugoslavia, attempting a rapprochement. Relations remain icy. 1955 Jun: In closed Party meeting in Bulgaria, for the first time he criticizes Stalin. 1956: Warsaw pact established. 1956 Feb: At 20th Party Congress, calls for peaceful coexistence with capitalism; admits possibility of different paths to socialism, revolution without violence; abandons doctrine of the inevitability of war; Mikoyan and Suslov make public criticisms of Stalin. 1956 Feb: Secret Speech to 20th Party Congress. Denounces "cult of the personality"; without naming names, suggests complicity of Malenkov and Kaganovich in Leningrad affair. 1956: Establishes special Central Committee bureau for the Russian Union Republic; makes himself head of this bureau and fills it with his supporters. 1956 Apr: Visits London. Has difficult meeting with Labour Party, which asks him to intervene in cases of 200 Social Democrats imprisoned in the Eastern bloc. Khrushchev interprets this as a calculated insult. 1956 Jun 28: Worker unrest begins in Poznan, Poland. 1956: Great harvest in virgin lands. Good year for corn everywhere. 1956: Escapes assassination attempt. Cruiser Red Ukraine in Sebastopol blows up minutes after Khrushchev disembarks. 1956 Oct: Polish communist party defies Moscow and names Gomulka, a victim of Stalin, as First Secretary. 1956 Oct 24: Hungarian uprising begins. 1956 Nov: Hungarian rebellion quashed. 1956: Khrushchev labels Dudintsev''s works severely anti-Soviet. Thaw coming to an end. 1957: In Stavropol region, experiment tried whereby large kolkhozes merged with servicing Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). Results good. Khrushchev calls for gradual and selective implementation of this type of merger. 1957 Feb 13: Proposes decentralization of light industry with creation of special regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozy). Supported by regional Party committees; opposed by Moscow bureaucracy. 1957 May: Sovnarkhozy idea becomes law. 1957 May: Central Committee conference on writers prescribes limits on artistic freedom. At garden party, Khrushchev verbally assaults several writers; poetess Margarita Aliger swoons. 1957 May: Suggests spectacular leap forward in meat, milk and butter production, aimed at overtaking U.S. by 1960-61. Anti-Party coup 1957 Jun 18: Malenkov, Molotov & Kaganovich orchestrate Presidium vote to dismiss Khrushchev. Vote is 8-4, only Suslov, Furtseva, and Mikoyan support Khrushchev. Khrushchev refuses to accept the vote; he says "Certainly in arithmetic two and two make four. But politics are not arithmetic. They are something different." He demands a vote by the Central Committee. Marshal Zhukov, a Khrushchev ally, uses Army transport planes to rush Khrushchev supporters from the far-flung regions to Moscow. 1957 Jun 22: Central Committee meets to consider Khrushchev''s dismissal. Zhukov threatens to release documents proving Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov''s complicity in the purge years. Central Committee overturns Presidium vote. Malenkov sent to be director of power station in a remote corner of Central Asia; Kaganovich made director of cement factory in Sverdlovsk; Molotov made ambassador to Mongolia. 1957 Oct: Zhukov removed as Defense Minister, Presidium member and Central Committee member for supposed "adventurism" and "Bonapartism" 1957 Oct: First sputnik launched. 1957 Nov: Hosts conference of Communist Parties in Moscow 1958: Assumes role of chairman (Premier) of the Soviet of Ministers as well as party leader, forcing Bulganin to resign. 1958 Mar: Forgetting his own counsels of moderation, Khrushchev calls for elimination of Machine Tractor Stations, forcing kolkhozes to purchase them from the government. Prices for new and used equipment was the same. Kolkhozes suffer financially. 1958 Aug: Bulganin removed. 1959: Because of MTS reform, manufacture of agricultural machines falls into decline, since kolkhozes don''t have funds to buy new equipment. 1959 Jan: Riazan Oblast (A.N. Larionov, First Secretary) promised to triple delivery and sale of meat to the government in one year. 1959 Feb: Khrushchev goes to Riazan to award oblast Order of Lenin for its meat production promises. 1959 Nov: Visits USA with Mikoyan and Kozlov. 1959 Dec 16: Riazan meets meat production goals (by slaughtering milk cows, breeding stock, etc., buying livestock from different regions, imposing taxes to be paid only in meat). Larionov made Hero of Socialist Labor and given Order of Lenin. 1959: Soviet technicians withdrawn from China. 1960: Riazan fiasco exposed. Larionov shoots self. 1960 May: U.S. U-2 spy plane of Francis Gary Powers shot down. 1960 Jun: Summit conference in Paris. 1960 Sep: Addresses UN in New York. 1960 Nov: Break with China revealed to Communist Parties of the world at Moscow conference. 1961: Meets Kennedy in Vienna. 1961 April: Gagarin first man in space. 1961 summer: Meets with Kennedy in Vienna. 1961 autumn: First public attacks on China. 1961: Stalin''s body removed from Lenin''s mausoleum. 1962: Solzhenitsyn''s One Day In the Live of Ivan Denisovich published. 1962: Creates separate industrial and agricultural Party and local Soviet networks. 1962: Orders shooting?at protesting workers in Novocherkassk. Hundreds die, more executed and jailed, victims'' families exiled. 1962 Oct: Cuban missile crisis. 1962 Nov: Condemns abstractionists & avant-gardists at Manezh Art Show. 1963: US-USSR hotline established. 1963 Cracks down on writers and artists. 1963 Aug 4: Signs nuclear test-ban treaty. 1963: Disastrous harvest. 1964 Sep: Sends Adzhubei to Bonn for possible accommodation with West Germany. 1964 Oct: Deposed by Brezhnev. 1971: Dies |
