| LECTURE#18 |
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Why did the Whites lost the Civil war? The Constituent Assembly (31 January 1918). Moscow becomes the capital of RSFSR. L. Trotskii and The Red Army: building up the force. The peace treaty of Brest - Litovsk (3 March 1918). The struggle with the Left Socialists, the establishment of the one - party control in the Soviets. The murder of the Tsar (17 July 1918). The massive reprisals in Petrograd, The Red & White Terror. The Civil War of 1918 – 1921 and the famine of 1922. The Military Communism as an economical model.
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the R.S.F.S.R. Adopted by the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets 10 July 1918 Preamble The Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People, approved by the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in January 1918, together with the constitution of the Soviet Republic approved by the Fifth Congress, make up the single fundamental law of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. This fundamental law becomes effective from the moment of its publication in final form in Izvestia Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta. It shall be published by all local organs of Soviet government and prominently displayed in all Soviet institutions. The Fifth Congress instructs the People''s Commissariat for Public Education to introduce in all schools and other educational establishments of the Russian Republic, without exception, the study of the basic provisions of the present constitution, as well as their explanation and interpretation. Part One: Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People Chapter One Article 1. Russia is hereby proclaimed a Republic of Soviets of Workers'', Soldiers'' and Peasants'' Deputies. All power, centrally and locally, is vested in these Soviets. Article 2. The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the principle of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics. Chapter Two Article 3. Its fundamental aim being abolition of all exploitation of man by man, complete elimination of the division of society into classes, merciless suppression of the exploiters, socialist organization of society, and victory of socialism in all countries, the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers'', Soldiers'' and Peasants'' Deputies further resolves: Pursuant to the socialization of land, private land ownership is hereby abolished, and all land is proclaimed the property of the entire people and turned over to the working people without any redemption, on the principles of egalitarian land tenure. All forests, mineral wealth and waters of national importance, as well as all live and dead stock, model estates and agricultural enterprises are proclaimed the property of the nation. The Soviet laws on workers'' control and on the Supreme Economic Council are hereby confirmed in order to guarantee the power of the working people over the exploiters and as a first step towards the complete conversion of factories, mines, railways and other means of production and transportation into the property of the Soviet Workers'' and Peasants'' Republic. The Third Congress of Soviets regards as a first blow at international banking, financial capital, the Soviet law on the annulment of loans negotiated by the governments of the tsar, the landlords and the bourgeoisie and expresses confidence that Soviet power will be advancing steadfastly along this road until the complete victory of an international workers'' uprising against the rule of capital. To ensure the sovereign power of the working people and to rule out any possibility of restoration of the power of the exploiters, the arming of the working people, the creation of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants, and the complete disarming of the propertied classes are hereby decreed. Chapter Three Article 4. Expressing firm determination to wrest mankind from the clutches of finance capital and imperialism, which have in this most criminal of wars drenched the world in blood, the Third Congress of Soviets unreservedly endorses Soviet policy of denouncing the secret treaties, organizing most extensive fraternization with the workers and peasants of the combatant armies and achieving at all costs by revolutionary means a democratic peace for the working people, without annexations of indemnities, on the basis of free self-determination of nations. Article 5. With the same aim in view, the Third Congress of Soviets insists on a complete break with the barbarous policy of bourgeois civilization, which has built the prosperity of the exploiters in a few chosen nations through the enslavement of hundreds of millions of working people in Asia, in the colonies in general, and in small countries. Article 6. The Third Congress of Soviets supports the policy of the Council of People''s Commissars which has proclaimed the complete independence of Finland, commenced the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and proclaimed freedom of self-determination for Armenia. Chapter Four Article 7. The Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets holds that now, in the hour of the people''s resolute struggle against the exploiters, there should be no room for exploiters in any governmental agency. Power must belong fully and exclusively to the working people and their plenipotentiary representatives - the Soviets of Workers'', Soldiers'' and Peasants'' Deputies. Article 8. At the same time, endeavouring to create a genuinely free and voluntary, and therefore all the more firm and stable, union of the working classes of all the nations of Russia, the Third Congress of Soviets confines itself to promulgating the fundamental principles of a federation of Soviet republics of Russia, leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to decide independently at their own representative congresses of soviets whether they wish to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what terms. Part Two: General Provisions of the Constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. Chapter Five Article 9. The main objective of the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, designed for the present transitional period, is to establish the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful All-Russia Soviet Government, with a view to completely suppressing the bourgeoisie, abolishing exploitation of man by man, and establishing socialism, under which there will be neither division into classes nor state power. Article 10. The Russian Republic is a free socialist society of all the working people of Russia. All power in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic belongs to the entire working population of the country united in urban and rural soviets. Article 11. The soviets of regions with a distinct mode of living and national composition can unite in autonomous regional unions at the head of which, as at the head of all regional unions that can be eventually formed, stand regional congresses of Soviets and their executive agencies. These autonomous regional unions form, on a federal basis, component parts of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Article 12. Supreme power in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is exercised by the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, and in the intervals between Congresses by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Article 13. In order to ensure genuine freedom of conscience for the working people, the church is separated from the State, and the school from the church: and freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens. Article 14. In order to ensure genuine freedom of expression for the working people, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic abolishes the dependence of the press on capital, and places at the disposal of the working class and the poor peasantry all the technical and material requisites for the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books and all other printed matter, and guarantees their unhindered circulation throughout the country. Article 15. In order to ensure genuine freedom of assembly for the working people, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, recognizing the right of citizens of the Soviet Republic freely to hold assemblies, meetings, processions, etc., places at the disposal of the working class and the poor peasantry all buildings suitable for the holding of public gatherings, complete with furnishing, lighting and heating. Article 16. In order to ensure genuine freedom of association for the working people, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, having destroyed the economic and political rule of the propertied classes and thereby removed all the obstacles which heretofore, in bourgeois society, prevented the workers and peasants from enjoying freedom of organization and action, renders material and all other assistance to the workers and poorest peasants for purposes of their association and organization. Article 17. In order to ensure access to knowledge for the working people, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic makes its aim to give the workers and poorest peasants complete all-round and free education. Article 18. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic declares labour to be the duty of all citizens of the Republic, and proclaims the slogan: ''He who does not work, neither shall he eat!''. Article 19. In order to safeguard the gains of the great workers'' and peasants'' revolution, the Russian Socialist Federative Republic declares defence of the socialist Fatherland to be the duty of all the citizens of the Republic and introduces universal military service. The honourable right of bearing arms in defence of the revolution is granted only to working people; non-working elements are enlisted for other military duties. Article 20. Proceeding from the principle of solidarity of the working people of all nations, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic grants full political rights of Russian citizens to foreigners residing in the territory of the Russian Republic for purposes of employment, and belonging to the working class or to the peasantry not employing the labour of others: and it empowers the local Soviets to grant to such foreigners, without any cumbersome formalities, Russian citizenship rights. Article 21. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic grants the right of asylum to all foreigners subjected to persecution for political and religious crimes. Article 22. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, recognizing the equality of rights of all citizens, irrespective of their race or nationality, declares the establishment or toleration on this basis of any privileges or advantages, or any oppression of national minorities or restriction of their equality, to be contraventions of the fundamental laws of the Republic. Article 23. Guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic deprives individuals and groups of rights, which they utilize to the detriment of the socialist revolution. Part Three: The Structure of Soviet Government A. Organization of the central authority Chapter Six The All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers'', Peasants, Cossacks'' and Red Army Soldiers'' Deputies Article 24. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is the supreme authority of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Article 25. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of urban Soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 25,000 electors, and representatives of gubernia congresses of Soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 of the population. NOTE 1. In the event of a gubernia congress of Soviets not preceding the All-Russia Congress, delegates to the latter are sent directly by uyezd congresses. NOTE 2. In the event of a regional congress of Soviets directly preceding the All-Russia Congress, delegates to the latter can be sent by the regional congress. Article 26. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is convened by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee at least twice a year. Article 27. An extraordinary All-Russia Congress of Soviets is convened by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on its own initiative, or on the demand of the Soviets of localities inhabited by at least one-third of the population of the Republic. Article 28. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets elects the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, to consist of not more than 200 members. Article 29. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee is fully accountable to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets. Article 30. In the intervals between Congresses the All-Russia Central Executive Committee is the supreme authority of the Republic. Chapter Seven The All-Russia Central Executive Committee Article 31. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee is the highest legislative, administrative and supervisory body of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Article 32. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee gives general directives for the activity of the Workers'' and Peasants'' Government and all organs of Soviet power in the country; unites and co-ordinates legislative and administrative activities, and supervises the implementation of the Soviet constitution and of the decisions of All-Russia Congresses of Soviets and the central bodies of Soviet power. Article 33. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee examines and approves draft decrees and other proposals submitted by the Council of People''s Commissars or by separate departments, and issues its own decrees and ordinances. Article 34. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee convenes the All-Russia Congress of Soviets, to which it submits an account of its activity and reports on general policy and particular matters. Article 35. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee appoints the Council of People''s Commissars for general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and departments (People''s Commissariats) to be in charge of particular branches of the administration. Article 36. The members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee work in the departments (People''s Commissariats) or carry out special commissions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Chapter Eight The Council of People''s Commissars Article 37. The Council of People''s Commissars exercises general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Article 38. In pursuance of this task the Council of People''s Commissars issues decrees, ordinances, instructions and generally takes what measures are necessary to ensure the proper course of life of the State. Article 39. The Council of People''s Commissars immediately notifies the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of all its orders and decisions. Article 40. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee has the right to cancel or suspend any order or decision of the Council of People''s Commissars. Article 41. All decisions and orders of the Council of People''s Commissars which are of major general political importance are submitted to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee for consideration and approval. NOTE. Urgent measures can be taken by the Council of People''s Commissars directly. Article 42. Members of the Council of People''s Commissars head the People''s Commissariats. Article 43. Eighteen People''s Commissariats are formed: Foreign Affairs; Military Affairs; Maritime Affairs; Interior; Justice; Labour; Social Security; Public Education; Post and Telegraph; Nationalities Affairs; Finance; Transport; Agriculture; Trade and Industry; Food Supply; State Control; The Supreme Economic Council; Public Health. Article 44. Under the chairmanship of every People''s Commissar a board is constituted whose members are confirmed by the Council of People''s Commissars. Article 45. The People''s Commissar has the right personally to take decisions on all matters that come within the competence of his commissariat. In the event of its disagreement with a decision of the People''s Commissar the board can, without suspending the implementation of the decision, appeal against it to the Council of People''s Commissars or the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. The same right of appeal belongs to individual members of the board. Article 46. The Council of People''s Commissars is fully accountable to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Article 47. The People''s Commissars and the boards of the People''s Commissariats are fully accountable to the Council of People''s Commissars and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Article 48. The rank of People''s Commissar is given exclusively to members of the Council of People''s Commissars, which manages the general affairs of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and cannot be conferred on any other representative of Soviet government either in the centre or in the provinces. Chapter Nine The Jurisdiction of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee Article 49. Within the jurisdiction of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the Central Executive Committee come all matters of State importance, viz: Approval and amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. General guidance of the foreign and domestic policy of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Delimitation and modification of frontiers, as well as alienation of parts of the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic or of rights belonging to it. Delimitation of the boundaries and spheres of jurisdiction of the regional unions of soviets forming part of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, as well as settlement of disputes between them. Admission of new members into the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and confirmation of secession of parts of the Russian Federation. General determination of the administrative divisions of the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and confirmation of regional formations. Establishment and modification of the system of weights and measures and the monetary system on the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Relations with foreign states, declaration of war and conclusion of peace. Contracting and granting of loans, conclusion of customs and trade treaties and financial agreements. Determination of the fundamentals and the general plan of the national economy and its branches on the territory of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Approval of the budget of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Establishment of federal taxes and duties. Definition of the basic principles of organization of the armed forces of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Federal legislation, the judicial system and judicial procedure, civil and criminal legislation, etc. Appointment and dismissal of individual members of the Council of People''s Commissars and of the Council of People''s Commissars as a whole, as well as confirmation of the Chairman of the Council of People''s Commissars. General regulations on the acquisition and loss of Russian citizenship rights and on the rights of foreigners on the territory of the Republic. The right of amnesty, general and partial. Article 50. In addition to the matters listed above, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee decide all questions which they find coming within their competence. Article 51. It is the exclusive prerogative of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets to: define and amend the basic principles of the Soviet constitution; ratify peace treaties. Article 52. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee may decide matters indicated in paragraphs (c) and (h) of Article 49 only when an All-Russian Congress of Soviets cannot be convened. B. Organization of Local Soviet Authority Chapter Ten Congresses of Soviets Article 53. Congresses of Soviets are composed as follows: Oblast (regional) congresses- of representatives of city Soviets and uyezd congresses, on the basis of one delegate per 25,000 residents, and from cities, one delegate per 5,000 electors, with not more than 500 delegates from the region as a whole; or of representatives of gubernia congresses of soviets, elected on the same basis, if such congresses directly precede the regional congress. Gubernia (area) congresses of representatives of city Soviets and volost congresses, on the basis of one delegate per 10,000 residents and from cities, one deputy per 2,000 electors, with not more than 300 delegates from the gubernia (area) as a whole. If uyezd congresses of Soviets directly precede the gubernia congress, elections are conducted on the same basis, by uyezd rather than volost congresses. Uyezd (district) congresses of representatives of village soviets, on the basis of one delegate per 1,000 residents, with not more than 300 delegates from the uyezd (district) as a whole. Volost congresses of representatives of all village soviets of the volost, on the basis of one delegate for every ten members of a soviet. NOTE 1. Uyezd congresses are attended by representatives of the Soviets of towns whose population does not exceed 10,000; village soviets of localities with a population of less than 1,000 unite to elect delegates to the uyezd congress. NOTE 2. Village Soviets having less than ten members send to the volost congress one representative each. Article 54. Congresses of Soviets are convened by the respective local executive bodies of Soviet authority (executive committees) at their discretion, or on the demand of the Soviets of localities accounting for not less than one-third of the population of the given territorial unit: but in any event at least twice a year in a region, once in every three months in a gubernia or uyezd, and once a month in a volost. NOTE 1. Uyezd congresses are attended by representatives of the Soviets of towns whose population does not exceed 10,000; village soviets of localities with a population of less than 1,000 unite to elect delegates to the uyezd congress. NOTE 2. Village Soviets having less than ten members send to the volost congress one representative each. Article 55. The region, gubernia, uyezd or volost congress of Soviets elects its executive committee, to consist of not more than: (a) 25 members in a region or gubernia; (b) 20 in an uyezd, and (c) 10 in a volost. The executive committee is fully accountable to the congress of Soviets that elected it. Article 56. Within the boundaries of its region, gubernia, uyezd or volost, the congress of Soviets is the highest authority; in the intervals between congresses this authority is vested in the executive committee. Chapter Eleven The Soviets of Deputies Article 57. The soviets of deputies are composed as follows: In cities - on the basis of one deputy per 1,000 of the population, but with not less than 50 and not more than 1,000 members. In rural localities (villages, Cossack settlements, towns with less than 10,000 residents, auls, hamlets, etc.) - on the basis of one deputy per 100 of the population, but with not less than three and not more than 50 deputies per locality. The term of office of deputies is three months. Article 58. For day-to-day work, the Soviets of deputies elect, from among their members, executive bodies (executive committees) consisting of not more than five members in villages, and on the basis of one member per fifty deputies, but with not less than three and not more than fifteen members, in cities (not more than forty members in Petersburg and Moscow). The executive committee is fully accountable to the Soviet which elected it. Article 59. Sessions of the soviet of deputies are convened by the executive committee at its discretion, or on the demand of not less than half of the deputies to the Soviet: but at least once a week in cities and twice a week in rural areas. Article 60. Within the boundaries of the given locality the soviet or, in the event envisaged in Article 57 (Note), the general meeting of electors, is the highest authority. Chapter Twelve The Jurisdiction of Local Bodies of Soviet Rule Article 61. The regional, gubernia, uyezd and volost bodies of Soviet rule and the soviets of deputies: Put into effect all decisions of the corresponding higher bodies of soviet rule; Take all measures to promote the cultural and economic development of the given territory; Decide all questions of purely local importance (for the given territory); Co-ordinate all soviet activity within the boundaries of the given territory. Article 62. The congress of soviets and their executive bodies have the right of control over the activities of the local soviets (i.e. those of regions have the right of control over all the soviets of the given region; those of gubernias, over all the soviets of the given gubernia, with the exception of city soviets not forming parts of uyezd congresses, etc.); the regional and gubernia congresses and their executive committees have, in addition, the right to cancel decisions of the soviets functioning in their localities, notifying, in the most important instances, the central Soviet authority. Article 63. To ensure fulfilment of the tasks devolving on the organs of Soviet authority, city and village soviets and regional, gubernia, uyezd and volost executive committees set up corresponding departments and appoint their heads. Part Four: Active and Passive Suffrage Chapter Thirteen Article 64. The right to elect and to be elected to soviets is enjoyed, irrespective of religion, nationality, sex, domicile, etc. by the following citizens of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic who have reached the age of eighteen by polling day: All those who earn a living by productive and socially useful labour (as well as persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to work productively), viz. wage and salaried workers of all groups and categories engaged in industry, trade, agriculture, etc. and peasants and Cossack farmers who do not employ hired labour for profit; Soldiers of the Soviet army and navy; Citizens belonging to categories listed in Paragraphs (a) and (b) of the present article who have been to any degree incapacitated. NOTE 1. The local soviets may, subject to approval by the central authority, lower the age limit established in the present article. NOTE 2. As far as resident foreigners are concerned, active and passive suffrage is enjoyed by persons indicated (Part Two, Chapter V). Article 65. The right to elect and to be elected is denied to the following persons, even if they belong to one of the categories listed above: Persons who employ hired labour for profit; Persons living on unearned income, such as interest on capital, profits from enterprises, receipts from property, etc.; Private traders and commercial middle-men; Monks and ministers of religion; Employees and agents of the former police, the special corps of gendarmerie and the secret political police department, as well as members of the former imperial family; Persons declared insane by legal proceeding, as well as persons in ward; Persons condemned for pecuniary and infamous crimes to terms established by law or by a court decision. Chapter Fourteen The Conduct of Elections Article 66. Elections are held, according to established customs, on days appointed by local Soviets. Article 67. Elections are conducted in the presence of an electoral commission and a representative of the local soviet.[/p] Article 68. In instances when the presence of a representative of Soviet authority is technically impossible, he is replaced by the electoral commission chairman or, in the absence of the latter, by the chairman of the electoral assembly. Article 69. The proceedings and results of the election are recorded in a minute signed by the members of the electoral commission and the representative of the soviet. Article 70. The detailed procedure for the conduct of elections, and for the participation in them of trade unions and other workers'' organizations, is determined by the local soviets in keeping with instructions issued by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Chapter Fifteen Verification and Revocation of Election Returns Recall of Deputies Article 71. All material pertaining to the conduct of elections is forwarded to the respective soviet. Article 72. The soviet appoints a credentials committee to verify the results of the elections. Article 73. The credentials committee reports to the soviet on its findings. Article 74. The soviet decides the question of confirming disputed candidates. Article 75. Should the Soviet reject a candidate, it appoints re-elections. Article 76. Should the elections as a whole be found faulty, the question of annulling them is decided by the higher body of soviet rule. Article 77. The final instance for annulling elections to soviets is the All-Russia Central Executive Committee. Article 78. The electors who have sent a deputy to the Soviet have the right to recall him at any time, and to hold new elections, in keeping with the general rules.[/p] Part Five: Budgetary Law Chapter Sixteen Article 79. The main objective of the fiscal policy of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in the current transitional period of the dictatorship of the working people is expropriation of the bourgeoisie and preparation of conditions for the universal equality of the citizens of the Republic in the sphere of production and distribution of values. It is therefore aimed at placing at the disposal of the organs of Soviet power all the means necessary for satisfying the local and national needs of the Soviet Republic, in the pursuit of which tasks it will not stop at invading the sphere of the right of private ownership. Article 80. The state revenues and expenditures of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic are united in the state budget. Article 81. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets or the All-Russia Central Executive Committee determine which revenues and duties accrue to the state budget and which are placed at the disposal of the local soviets, and establish the limits of taxation. Article 82. The soviets collect taxes and rates for exclusively local economic needs. The requirements of the state as a whole are met out of resources allocated by the State Treasury. Article 83. No expenditures can be made out of the resources of the State Treasury unless provided for in the state budget, or without a special decision of the central authority. Article 84. To meet needs of national importance, local soviets are allotted credits by the appropriate People''s Commissariats out of State Treasury funds. Article 85. All State Treasury credits, and credits approved for local needs, are expanded by soviets strictly as provided for in their budgets, and cannot be used for other purposes without a special decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People''s Commissars. Article 86. Local soviets draw up half-yearly and yearly estimates of revenues and expenditures for local needs. The estimates of village and volost soviets and soviets of cities participating in [/i]uyezd[/i] congresses, and those of the uyezd organs of Soviet power, are approved by the respective gubernia and oblast congresses or their executive committees the estimates of city, gubernia and regional bodies of Soviet power are approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People''s Commissars. Article 87. Should the need arise for expenditures insufficiently provided for in the estimates, or not provided for at all, the soviets apply for additional allocations to the respective People''s Commissariats. Article 88. In the event of local resources proving insufficient to satisfy local needs, the issue of subsidies or loans to local soviets necessary to cover urgent expenditures is authorized by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People''s Commissars. Part Six: The Arms and the Flag of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic Chapter Seventeen Article 89. The Arms of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic consist of a sickle and a hammer with their handles crossed, pointing downwards, gold upon a red field in the sun''s rays, and surrounded by a wreath of ears of grain, with the inscriptions: ''Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic'', and ''Proletarians of all Countries, Unite!'' Article 90. The flag and ensign of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is of red cloth with the gold letters ''RSFSR'' or the words ''Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic'' in the left upper corner near the staff. Chairman of the Fifth All-Russia Congress of Soviets and of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, Y. A. SVERDLOV. Members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, G. I. TEODOROVICH, F. A. ROZIN, A. K. MITROFANOV, K. G. MAXIMOV. Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, V. A. AVANESOV. _____________________________________________________________________________________ The Russian Civil War: 1918-1921 The Russian Civil War between the Bolsheviks (Reds) and their political opponents (Whites) did as much to create the USSR as the Revolution of 1917. Bolshevik objectives in November 1917 were unclear, but in the merciless civil strife between Reds and Whites were laid the foundations of the autocratic Soviet system. The Bolshevik Party was hardened and militarized, systematic terror began, extreme economic policies were adopted, and implacable hostility developed toward the West. The Civil war, though not wholly responsible for these, made Bolshevik policies much more draconian. I. Consolidation of Bolshevik Power After moving to Moscow early in 1918, Lenin''s regime came under intense military and political pressure. As White forces approached, Lenin set up a ruthless emergency government, which sought to mobilize central Russia''s total resources. "The republic is an armed camp," Nicholas Bukharin declared. "One must rule with iron when one cannot rule with law." Relatively democratic norms of party life in 1917 yielded to dictatorship, and local popular bodies were suppressed. Lenin made major political and economic decisions and reconciled jealous subordinates. Wisely, he let Trotsky handle military affairs, confirmed his decisions, and defended the able war commissar against intrigues by Stalin and others. Jakob Sverdlov ran the party organization until his death in 1919 when Stalin assumed that role. The eighth Party Congress in 1919 created the first operating Politburo with five full members (Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, and N.M. Krestinsky) and three candidates (Bukharin, Zinoviev and M. Kalinin) constituting Bolshevism''s general staff. In January 1918, Lenin, proclaiming the Third Congress of Soviets the supreme power in Russia, had it draft a constitution. At the Congress some delegates advocated genuine separation of powers and autonomy for local soviets, but the successful Stalin-Sverdlov draft outlined, instead, a highly centralized political system, which concentrated all power in top government and party bodies. The Constitution of 1918, disfranchising former "exploiters" (capitalists, priests, and nobles) and .depriving them of civil rights, supposedly guaranteed all democratic freedoms to the working class. Urban workers received weighted votes to counteract the peasantry''s huge numerical superiority. Between congresses of Soviets, a 200-member Central Executive Committee was to exercise supreme power and appoint the executive, the Council of People''s Commissars. A hierarchy of national, regional, provincial, district, and local soviets was to govern Soviet Russia. The Constitution, however, omitted mention of the Bolshevik Party, possessor of all real political power! A. National Aspirations As the Soviet regime consolidated political control over central Russia, long repressed national aspirations for independence disintegrated the former tsarist empire until Russia was reduced virtually to the boundaries of 1600. The Civil war, like the time of Troubles, brought political conflict, social turmoil, foreign intervention, and ultimate national Russian resurgence and reunification. Soviet accounts stress heroic Russian resistance in both instances to foreign aggression. The southern frontier-the "Wild Field"--again became a refuge for rebels against a shaky regime in Moscow, and western borderlands broke away to secure independence. Anti-Communist Finns defeated Bolshevik-supported Red Finns to create an independent Finland, and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, assisted by German occupiers, declared independence and retained it until 1940. In the Ukraine a moderate General Secretariat signed a treaty with the Germans who occupied that region and set up a puppet regime under "Hetman" Skoropadski, opposed by Bolsheviks and many Ukrainian nationalists. In Belorussia an anti-Communist Hromada declared independence, but the national movement there was less developed and lacked a broad popular following. In the Caucasus a Transcaucasian Federative Republic existed briefly in 1918 before yielding to separate regimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan under foreign protection. In Central Asia Tashkent was an isolated Bolshevik fortress in a sea of disunited Moslems. The SRs created regimes in western Siberia and at Samara on the Volga, while Cossack areas of the Urals and the North Caucasus formed a Southeastern Union. Russia had almost dissolved. To undermine the tsarist empire and Provisional Government, the Bolsheviks had used the slogan of national self-determination. However, as early as 1903, most Russian Social Democrats, preferring, like Marx, large, centralized states, had rejected federalism. Viewing nationalism as a capitalist by-product which would disappear under socialism, the Bolsheviks underestimated its power and attractiveness, though Lenin exploited national movements to bring his party into power. He advocated political self-determination in 1917 for every nation in the Russian Empire, but aimed to reunite them subsequently with a Russian socialist state. Grigorii Piatakov, a Bolshevik leader in the Ukraine, expressed the party''s view bluntly: On the whole we must not support the Ukrainians, because their movement is not convenient for the proletariat. Russia cannot exist without the Ukrainian sugar industry, and the same can be said in regard to coal (Donbass), cereals (the black earth belt), etc .... Realizing that without the resources of the western borderlands Soviet Russia would not be major power, Lenin strove to reconcile advocacy of national self-determination with Soviet Russian unity. At his instruction Joseph Stalin formulated a Bolshevik doctrine of "proletarian self-determination" limited to "toilers," denying it to the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. National independence would be recognized only "upon the demand of the working population...," meaning in fact local Bolsheviks subject to control by Moscow. B. Military Opposition Opposition to Lenin''s government began in November 1917 but at first was disorganized and ineffective. Many Russians believed that the Soviet regime would soon collapse, and an ideological gulf divided conservative military elements from moderates and socialists. In the Don region, General M.V. Alekseev, former imperial chief of staff, began organizing antiBolshevik elements soon after November into the Volunteer Army, which became the finest White fighting force. Before the Bolsheviks seized Russian military headquarters at Mogilev, some leading tsarist generals (Kornilov, A. I. Denikin, and others) escaped and joined Alekseev. The anti-Bolshevik White movement included socially and ideologically disparate elements lacking in unity and coordination. Former tsarist officers exercised military and often political leadership, and played a disproportionate role. Though some were of humble origin, their education and status separated them from a largely illiterate peasantry. White soldiers were mostly Cossacks, set apart from ordinary peasants by independent land holdings and proud traditions. Officers and Cossacks had little in common ideologically with Kadet and SR intellectuals except antipathy for Bolshevism. C. Trotsky''s Red Army Facing this motley opposition was a Red Army, created in January 1918. At first an undisciplined volunteer force, after Trotsky became War Commissar in April, it became a regular army with conscription and severe discipline imposed by former imperial officers. Trotsky defended this risky and controversial policy as "building socialism with the bricks of capitalism." To get Red soldiers to obey their officers, he appointed political commissars whose families were often held hostage to insure the officers'' loyalty. Trotsky raised uncertain Red Army morale by appearing in his famous armored train at critical points. In August 1918 at Sviiashsk near Kazan he rallied dispirited Red troops and helped turn the tide against the SRs. Soviet historians still give him no credit for this brilliant feat of inspiration and organization, which saved the regime. II. Uprising of Czechoslovak Brigade Full-scale civil war and Allied intervention followed an uprising in May 1918 of the Czechoslovak Brigade in Russia. The Czechs had joined the imperial Russian army during World War I and, surviving its collapse, remained perhaps the best organized military force in Russia. Wishing to go to the French front to fight for an independent Czechoslovakia, the Czechs quarreled with Soviet authorities. Then they seized the Trans-Siberian Railroad, cleared the reds from most of Siberia, and aided their white opponents. The Allies, claim Soviet accounts, employed the Czechs to activate all enemies of Red power, and with the United States intervened militarily to overthrow the Soviet regime. Western accounts affirm that Allied intervention was to restore a Russian front against Germany. President Wilson allowed Untied States participation in the Allied expeditions to north Russian ports in the summer of 1918 only after the Allied command insisted it was the only way to win World War I. Such individual Allied leaders as Winston Churchill and Marshal Foch, however, did aim to destroy Bolshevism through intervention. The Soviet-Western controversy over its nature and purpose still rages. A. White Generals The Civil War, fought initially with small Russian forces of uncertain morale, grew in scope and bitterness. Villages and entire regions changed hands repeatedly in a fratricidal conflict in which both sides committed terrible atrocities. At first the main threat to the Soviet regime, came from the east. In August 1918, SR troops, encouraged by the Czechs'' revolt, captured Kazan and the tsarist gold reserve, and formed SR regimes in Samara and in Omsk in western Siberia. 1. Kolchak and Iudenich After the Red Army regained Kazan, the SRs in Omsk were ousted by Admiral A. Kolchak, who won Czech and later Allied support, for his conservative Siberian regime. Early in 1919, pledging to reconvene the Constituent Assembly, Kolchak moved westward toward Archangel and Murmansk, controlled by the Allies and the White Russian army of General E. Miller. By late summer, however, the Red Army had forced him back across the Urals. White ad Allied armies hemmed in the Bolsheviks on every side. In the west, General Iudenich, commanding a British-equipped White army in Estonia, advanced close to Petrograd in October 1919, but Trotsky rallied its defenders and Iudenich''s army dissolved. 2. Denikin The chief military threat came from the south. Early in the fall of 1919, General Denikin, commanding Don Cossacks and the elite Volunteer Army equipped with British tanks, reached Orel, 250 miles south of Moscow. Then numerically superior Red forces counterattacked and drove him back, and in March 1920 the British evacuated the remnants of his army from Novorossiisk. The Bolsheviks gradually reasserted military and political control over the tsarist borderlands, except for Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states. In the west, they dissolved the Belorussian Rada and incorporated Belorussia. After the Central Powers withdrew from the Ukraine at the end of 1918, the Ukrainian nationalist Directory ousted their puppet, Hetman Skoropadski. Conservative and liberal nationalist elements competed with the Red Army for control of a Ukraine, which experienced incredible anarchy and turmoil. Early in 1919, the Red Army removed the Directory, but much of the Ukraine was conquered by Denikin''s Whites. In 1920, Red forced restored the rule of Ukrainian communists now wholly subservient to Moscow, virtually ending the abortive Ukrainian struggle for independence. Though the Allied powers recognized de factor independence of the three Caucasian republics early in 1920, Moscow''s rapprochement with Turkish nationalists paved the way for Soviet incorporation of the Transcaucasus. That spring, the Red Army occupied Azerbaijan; in December unfortunate Armenia succumbed; and in March 1921 Red forces conquered Menshevik-controlled Georgia against strong resistance. In Central Asia, the Bolsheviks conquered the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara and set up several artificial client national states. Bands of mounted Basmachi guerrillas resisted Red rule in Turkestan until the mid-1920s. With most of the former Russian empire reunited forcibly with its Great Russian core, the way was prepared for creation of the Soviet Union. B. Soviet-Polish War By Then the allies, except for the Japanese in Vladivostok, had departed and White resistance had weakened, but a Soviet-Polish war prolonged Russia''s agony. To reconstitute a Greater Poland, the forces of Marshal Joseph Pilsudski invaded the Ukraine and captured Kiev in May 1920. A Soviet counteroffensive carried General M.N. Tukhachevskii''s Red Army to Warsaw''s outskirts, and Lenin sought to communize Poland. The Poles, however, rallied, drove out the Red Army, and forced Soviet Russia to accept an armistice and later the unfavorable Treaty of Riga (March 1921). Soviet preoccupation with Poland enabled Baron Peter Wrangel, Denikin''s successor and the ablest White general, to consolidate control oft he Crimea. Wrangel employed capable Kadet leaders to carry through land reform, won peasant support, and occupied considerable areas to the north. After the Soviet-Polish armistice in October 1920, the Red Army smashed Wrangel''s resistance, and forced the evacuation of some 150,000 Whites to Constantinople. III. Reasons for Red Victory The Whites had lacked coordination, and were plagued by personal rivalries among their leaders. They denounced Bolshevism, but affirmed nothing. Denikin and Kolchak were moderates, who lacked effective political or economic programs. Their slogan: "A united and indivisible Russia" alienated national minorities, and played into Bolshevik hands. White generals made military blunders, but their political mistakes and disunity proved decisive. A. Allied intervention Allied intervention was of dubious value: foreign arms and supplies aided the Whites, but were insufficient to insure victory and let the Reds pose as defenders of Mother Russia. Bolshevik propaganda portrayed White generals (wrongly) as reactionary tools of Western imperialism, and (more correctly) as aiming to restore the landlords. Conversely, the Reds possessed able leadership, a disciplined party, clever propaganda, and a flexible policy of national self-determination. The Red Army had central positions, better discipline, and numerical superiority. Retaining worker support in the central industrial region, the Bolsheviks won the Civil War as they had won power in 1917 with superior leadership, unity, and purpose. B. Role of Russian Women Russian women, granted full civil, legal, and electoral equality in January 1918, by the new Bolshevik regime, played significant roles, some quite novel, during the Civil War. Their participation in medical services and combat was far broader than in World War I. In the Civil War, Russian women fought on every front, and with every weapon; the female machine-gunner made frequent appearances in early Soviet literature. From October 1919, women''s activities were coordinated by Zhenotdel (Women''s Department) of the Party''s Central Committee, and by 1920 women were being conscripted for noncombatant service and held important positions in the Red Army''s political departments. Inessa Armand, a close friend of Lenin, was Zhenotdel''s first director. She, along with Alexandra Kollontai and Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin''s wife, were leaders of women''s emancipation in early Soviet Russia. An estimated 74,000 women participated in the Russian Civil War, suffering casualties of about 1,800. Consolidation of Bolshevik Power National Aspirations Military Opposition Trotsky''s Red Army Uprising of Czechoslovak Brigade White Generals Soviet-Polish War Reasons for Red Victory Allied intervention Role of Russian Women Source: Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Westview Press, 1987). ____________________________________________________________________________________ *** What are the most important reasons for the communist victory in the civil war after the revolution? *** The Bolsheviks did have initial advantages such as the fact they held the majority of the industrial areas. Further their enemies were divided. Initially it was the Socialist Revolutionaries who led the opposition but their insurrection was led by their most right wing faction. In the Volga region this led them to alienate the peasants by insisting that the landlords could retain some of their land on a temporary basis. (see Figes: “A Peoples Tragedy” p.580). In a Russia deeply polarized between left and right they tried to sit in the center and so pleased no one. In Siberia they simply handed over power to a technocratic government that built up the Siberian Army as a right wing force. The result was, after some Byzantine intrigues, the Kolchak coup in Nov 1918. From then on it is the Whites, Kolchak and Denikin, who were the focus for the anti Bolshevik movement. They were a fairly mixed bunch often motivated by the mirror image of Bolshevik class hatred. They had no popular support to speak of and the brutal methods deepened the resentment of the local population in the areas they controlled. Newly conquered territory often meant they gained only the problem of keeping down a population that hated them. In Siberia many of the areas were run by warlords who resembled simple bandits concerned only to see how much they could loot as a result of the chaos. However much workers and peasants in Russia felt that the Bolsheviks had not lived up to their promises almost any regime seemed preferable to the Whites. In short the anti Bolshevik forces failed to create a popular anti-Bolshevik politics. For this bit try taking a glance at V Brovkin "Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War". *** How did the Red Victory influenced the western world? *** I suspect this question is unanswerable or to me more precise it has too many answers. The communist party was a major force in late Weimar Germany. What made the political crisis of the last days so deadly was that the Nazis and the Communists together could vote down any government. But the Communists had been an insignificant force until the left wing Independent Socialists fused with the Social Democrats. The left wing workers who had till then voted for the Independent Socialists switched to voting Communist. Hence the communist-socialist split was not the result of the Russian revolution but of fractures in German society as a result of the German revolution of 1918. I suspect that if you look at the effect of the Bolshevik revolution in other countries you will see something similar. If Communism or anti-communism were significant forces they almost certainly will turn out to be the result of local conditions. Hence similar movements would have occurred had there been no revolution in Russia. Of course the fact that such left wing movements often developed a slavish loyalty to the Moscow regime must have made a big difference but how much is probably impossible to untangle. Materials are taken from: http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/russ/rfaq.html ____________________________________________________________________ KORNILOV L.G. Lavr Georgiyevich Kornilov(July 18, 1870–April 13, 1918) was a Russian army general best known for the Kornilov Affair, an unsuccessful military coup he staged against Kerensky''s Provisional Government during the 1917 Russian Revolution. A Cossack born in Kazakhstan (then Russian Turkestan), Kornilov was a career officer in the Imperial Russian army. Between 1890 and 1904 he led several exploration missions in Eastern Turkestan, Afghanistan and Persia and learned several Central Asian languages. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 he was awarded Cross of St. George for bravery and promoted to the rank of colonel. He served as military attache in China from 1907-11 and with a rank of major general commanded an infantry division at the start of World War I, but was captured by the Austrians in April 1915. Escaping in July 1916, he was given command of the Petrograd Military District in March 1917, and was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Provisional Government''s armed forces in July 1917. General Kornilov decided to intervene in the chaotic situation of Russia, because he shared the widespread belief of many middle-class Russians that the country was descending into anarchy and that military defeat would be disastrous for Russian pride and honour. Lenin and his ''German spies'', he announced, should be hanged, the Soviets stamped out, military discipline restored and the provisional government ''restructured''. In August of 1917 Kornilov issued a call to all Russians to ''save their dying land'' and ordered his loyal troops to advance on Petrograd. Uncertain of the support of his army generals, Kerensky had to ask for help from other quarters; these included the Bolsheviks'' Red Guards. After his failed coup attempt in September of 1917, Kornilov was placed under house arrest. The Bolsheviks seized power shortly thereafter. Again escaping from his imprisonment, Kornilov made his way to the Don region, where he helped in the formation of the counter-revolutionary Volunteer Army at Novocherkassk with General Mikhail Alekseev. He was killed during fighting against Red forces at the Kuban capital Ekaterinodar in April 1918, when a shell landed on his headquarters. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavr_Georgevich_Kornilov Ome also check: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_movement _______________________________________________________________________ V. I. Lenin All Out for the Fight Against Denikin! Letter of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to Party Organisations Written: No later than 3 July, 1919 First Published: Published in the Bulletin of the C.C., R.C.P.(B.) No. 4, July 9, 1919; Published according to the Bulletin, verified with a typewritten copy bearing Lenin’s corrections Source: Lenin’s Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 Volume 29, pages 436-455 Translated: George Hanna Transcription/HTML Markup: David Walters & Robert Cymbala Copyleft: V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marx.org) 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License Comrades, This is one of the most critical, probably even the most critical moment for the socialist revolution. Those who defend the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, in Russia and abroad (primarily in Britain and France) are making a desperate effort to restore the power of those who seize the results of the people’s labour, the landowners and exploiters of Russia, in order to bolster up their power, which is waning all over the world. The British and French capitalists have failed in their plan to conquer the Ukraine using their own troops; they have failed in their support of Kolchak in Siberia; the Red Army, heroically advancing in the Urals with the help of the Urals workers who are rising to a man, is nearing Siberia to liberate it from the incredible tyranny and brutality of the capitalists who rule there. Lastly, the British and French imperialists have failed in their plan to seize Petrograd by means of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy with the participation of Russian monarchists, Cadets, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries (not excluding even Left Socialist-Revolutionaries). The foreign capitalists are now making a desperate effort to restore the yoke of capital by means of an onslaught by Denikin, whom they have supplied with officers, shells, tanks, etc., etc., as they once did Kolchak. All the forces of the workers and peasants, all the forces of the Soviet Republic, must be harnessed to repulse Denikin’s onslaught and to defeat him, without checking the Red Army’s victorious advance into the Urals and Siberia. That is the Main Task Of The Moment All Communists first and foremost, all sympathisers with them, all honest workers and peasants, all Soviet officials must pull themselves together like soldiers and concentrate to the maximum their work, their efforts and their concern directly on the tasks of the war, on the speedy repulse of Denikin’s attack, curtailing and rearranging all their other activities to allow for this task. The Soviet Republic is besieged by the enemy. It must become a single military camp, not in word but in deed. All the work of all institutions most be adapted to the war and placed on a military footing! Collegiate methods are essential for the conduct of the affairs of the workers’ and peasants’ state. But any expansion of these methods, any distortion of them resulting in red tape and irresponsibility, any conversion of collegiate bodies into talk-shops is a supreme evil, an evil which must be halted at all costs as quickly as possible and by whatever the means. Collegiate methods must not exceed an absolutely indispensable minimum in respect both to the number of members in the committees and to the efficient conduct of work; “speechifying” must be prohibited, opinions must be exchanged as rapidly as possible and confined to information and precisely formulated practical proposals. Whenever there is the slightest possibility, such methods must be reduced to the briefest discussion of only the most important questions in the narrowest collegiate bodies, while the practical management of institutions, enterprises, undertakings or tasks should be entrusted to one comrade, known for his firmness, resolution, boldness and ability to conduct practical affairs and who enjoys the greatest confidence. At any rate, and under all circumstances without exception, collegiate management must be accompanied by the priciest definition of the personal responsibility of every individual for a precisely defined job. To refer to collegiate methods as an excuse for irresponsibility is a most dangerous evil, threatening all who have not had very extensive experience in efficient collective work; in the army it all too often leads to inevitable disaster, chaos, panic, division of authority and defeat. A no less dangerous evil is organisational fuss or organisational fantasies. The reorganisation of work necessitated by the war must under no circumstances lead to the reorganisation of institutions, still less to the hasty formation of new institutions. That is absolutely impermissible and would only lead to chaos. The reorganisation of work should consist in suspending for a time institutions which are not absolutely essential, or in reducing their size to a certain extent. But all war work must be conducted entirely and exclusively through already existing military institutions, by improving, strengthening, expanding and supporting them. The creation of special “defence committees” or “revcoms” (revolutionary or revolutionary military committees) is permissible, first, only by way of exception, secondly, only with the approval of the military authority concerned or the superior Soviet authority, and, thirdly, only provided this last condition is complied with. The Truth About Kolchak And Denikin Must Be Explained To The People Kolchak and Denikin are the chief, and the only serious, enemies of the Soviet Republic. If it were not for the help they are getting from the Entente (Britain, France, America) they would have collapsed long ago. It is only the help of the Entente which makes them strong. Nevertheless, they are still forced to deceive the people, to pretend from time to time that they support “democracy”, a “constituent assembly”, “government by the people”, etc. The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are only too willing to be duped. The truth about Kolchak (and his double, Denikin) has now been revealed in full. The shooting of tens of thousands of workers. The shooting even of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. The flogging of peasants of entire districts. The public flogging of women. The absolutely unbridled power of the officers, the sons of landowners. Endless looting. Such is the truth about Kolchak and Denikin. Increasing numbers of people even among the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who themselves betrayed the workers and sided with Kolchak and Denikin, are forced to admit this truth. All our agitation and propaganda must serve to inform the people of the truth. It must be explained that the alternative is either Kolchak and Denikin or Soviet power, the power (dictatorship) of the workers. There is no middle course; there can be no middle course. Particular use must be made of the testimony of non-Bolshevik eyewitnesses, of Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and non-party people who have been in the areas overrun by Kolchak or Denikin. Let every worker and peasant know what the issue of the struggle is, what awaits him in the event of a victory for Kolchak or Denikin. Work Among Men Called Up For Service One of our chief concerns must now be work among those liable to mobilisation, in aid of mobilisation, and among those already mobilised. Wherever mobilised men are concentrated, or where there are garrisons, and especially training depots, etc., every single Communist and sympathiser must be brought into action. They must all without exception unite and work, some daily, others, say, four or eight hours per week, in aid of mobilisation and among mobilised men, among the soldiers of the local garrison; it must be done in a properly organised manner, of course, each person being assigned appropriate work by the local Party organisation and the military authorities. Non-party people or members of parties other than the Communist Party are naturally not in a position to carry on ideological work against Denikin or Kolchak. But to release them for that reason from all work would be impermissible. Every means must be sought that would compel the whole population (and the wealthier sections, both in town and country, in the first place) to contribute their share, in one form or another, to help mobilisation or the mobilised. Measures to further the quickest and most effective training of the mobilised should form a special category of aid. The Soviet government is calling up all ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc. The Communist Party, as well as all sympathisers and all workers, must assist the workers’ and peasants’ state, first, by helping to round up all ex-officers, non-commissioned officers, etc., who do not report for service, and, secondly, by organising, under the control of the Party organisation or attached to it, groups of those who have had theoretical or practical (e.g., in the imperialist war) military training and who are capable of doing their share. Work Among Deserters An obvious change for the better has latterly taken place in the fight against desertion. In a number of gubernias deserters have begun to return to the army en masse; it is no exaggeration to say that deserters are flocking to the Red Army. The reasons are, first, that Party comrades are working more efficiently and systematically, and, secondly, the peasants’ growing realisation that Kolchak and Denikin mean the restoration of a regime which is worse than the tsarist, the restoration of slavery for the workers and peasants, and of floggings, robbery and insults on the part of the officers and scions of the nobility. We must therefore everywhere lay special stress on the work among deserters to bring them back into the army, and must spare no effort in this work. That is one of the primary and urgent tasks of the day. Incidentally, the fact that deserters can be influenced by persuasion and that the persuasion can be effective shows that the workers’ state has a special attitude towards the peasants, and in this it differs from the landowner or capitalist state The rule of the bludgeon or the rule of hunger—that is what constitutes the sole source of discipline of the latter two forms of state. A different source of discipline is possible in the case of the workers’ state, or the dictatorship of the proletariat—that of persuasion of the peasants by the workers, a comradely alliance between them. When you hear the accounts of eyewitnesses that in such-and-such a gubernia (Ryazan, for instance) thousands upon thousands of deserters are returning voluntarily, that the appeal at meetings to “comrades deserters” sometimes has a success which beggars all description, you begin to realise how much untapped strength there is in this comradely alliance between workers and peasants. The peasant has his prejudice, which makes him inclined to support the capitalist, the Socialist-Revolutionary, and “freedom to trade”, but he also has his sound judgement, which is impelling him more and more towards an alliance with the workers. Direct Aid To The Army What our army needs most is supplies—clothing, foot wear, arms, shells. With the country impoverished as it is, an immense effort has to be made to satisfy the army’s needs, and it is only the assistance which the capitalist robbers of Britain, France and America are so lavishly rendering Kolchak and Denikin that saves them from inevitable disaster due to shortage of supplies. But impoverished though Russia is, she still has endless resources which we have not yet utilised, and often have shown no ability to utilise. There are still many undisclosed or uninspected military stores, plenty of production potentialities which are being overlooked, partly owing to the deliberate sabotage of officials, partly owing to red tape, bureaucracy, inefficiency and incompetence—all those “sins of the past” which so inevitably and so drastically weigh upon every revolution which makes a “leap” into a new social order. Direct aid to the army in this respect is particularly important. The institutions in charge of it are particularly in need of “fresh blood”, of outside assistance, of the voluntary, vigorous and heroic initiative of the workers and peasants in the localities. We must appeal as widely as possible to the initiative of all class-conscious workers and peasants, and of all Soviet officials; we must test in different localities and in different fields of work different forms of assistance to the army in this respect. “Work in a revolutionary way” is far less in evidence here than in other spheres, yet “work in a revolutionary way” is needed here far more. The collection of arms from the population is an integral part of this work. It is natural that plenty of arms should have been hidden by the peasants and the bourgeoisie in a country which has been through four years of imperialist war followed by two people’s revolutions—it was inevitable that this should happen. But we must combat it with all our might now, in face of Denikin’s menacing onslaught whoever conceals or helps to conceal arms is guilty of a grave crime against the workers and peasants and deserves to be shot, for he is responsible for the death of thousands upon thousands of the finest Red Army men, who not infrequently perish only because of a shortage of arms at the fronts. The Petrograd comrades succeeded in unearthing thousands and thousands of rifles when they conducted mass searches in a strictly organised way. The rest of Russia must not lag behind Petrograd and must at all costs over take and outstrip it. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the largest numbers of rifles are hidden by the peasants, and often without the least evil intention, but solely from an ingrained distrust of any “state”, etc. If we have been able to do much, very much (in the best gubernias) by means of persuasion, skilful agitation and a proper approach to get deserters to return to the Red Army ♣voluntarily, there can be no doubt that just as much, if not more, can be done, and should be done, to secure a voluntary return of arms. Workers and peasants, look for concealed rifles and turn them over to the army! By doing so you will save yourselves from being massacred, shot, flogged wholesale and robbed by Kolchak and Denikin! Curtailment Of Work Not For The War To carry out even a part of the work briefly outlined above we shall need more and more workers, drawn, moreover, from the ranks of the most reliable, devoted and energetic Communists. But where are they to come from, bearing in mind the universal complaints about the dearth of such workers and the over-fatigue they are suffering from? There can be no doubt that these complaints are largely justified. If anyone were to gauge exactly how thin is that stratum of advanced workers and Communists who with the support and sympathy of the worker and peasant masses have administered Russia in these last twenty months, it would seem truly incredible. Yet we administered with signal success, building socialism, overcoming unparalleled difficulties, and vanquishing enemies, directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie, that raised their heads everywhere. We have already vanquished all enemies except one—the Entente, the all-powerful imperialist bourgeoisie of Britain, France and America. And we have broken one of the arms of this enemy too—Kolchak. We are only threatened by his other arm—Denikin. Fresh labour-power for the administration of the state and to carry out the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat are rapidly emerging in the shape of the worker and peasant youth who are most earnestly, zealously and fervidly learning, digesting the new impressions of the new order, throwing off the husk of old, capitalist and bourgeois democratic prejudices, and moulding themselves into even firmer Communists than the older generation. But however rapidly this new stratum may be emerging, however rapidly it may be learning and maturing in the fire of the Civil War and the frantic resistance of the bourgeoisie, all the same it cannot, in the next few months, supply us with a trained staff for the administration of the state. Yet it is precisely the next few months, the summer and autumn of 1919, that count, for it is essential to decide the struggle against Denikin, and it must be done immediately. In order to obtain a large number of well-trained workers to strengthen the war effort we must reduce in size a whole number of branches and institutions, not doing war work, or, rather, those not directly connected with the war, but doing Soviet work; we must reorganise on these lines (i.e., on the lines of reduction) all institutions and enterprises which are not absolutely indispensable. Take, as a case in point, the Scientific and Technological Department of the Supreme Economic Council. This is a highly valuable institution, one indispensable for the building of full-scale socialism and to account for and distribute all our scientific and technological forces properly. But is such an institution absolutely indispensable? Of course not. To assign to it people who could and should be immediately employed in urgent and absolutely indispensable communist work in the army or directly for the army would, at the present juncture, be a downright crime. There are quite a number of such institutions and departments of institutions in the centre and in the localities. In our efforts to achieve socialism in full we had to begin to set up such institutions immediately. But we would be fools or criminals, if, in the face of Denikin’s formidable attack, we were unable to reform our ranks in such a way as to suspend or reduce everything that is not absolutely indispensable. We must not give way to panic or succumb to the organisational urge and must not reorganise any institutions nor close them down altogether nor—which is particularly harmful when being done in haste—must we begin to build new institutions. What we must do is to suspend for three, four or five months all institutions or departments of institutions, both in the centre and in the localities, which are not absolutely indispensable, or, if it is not possible to suspend them altogether, reduce them for the same (approximately) period, reduce them to the greatest possible extent, in other words, reduce the work to an absolutely indispensable minimum. Inasmuch as our main purpose is to secure at once a large number of well-trained, experienced, devoted and tested Communists or socialist sympathisers for military work, we can incur the risk of temporarily leaving many of the heavily curtailed institutions (or departments of institutions) without a single Communist, of placing them exclusively in the hands of bourgeois executives. That is not a big risk, for it is only institutions which are not absolutely indispensable that are involved, and while there will certainly be a loss from the weakening of their (semi-suspended) activities, it will not be a great loss, and one which at any rate will not be fatal to us. Whereas insufficient energy in strengthening war work, and strengthening it immediately and considerably, may prove fatal to us. This must be clearly understood and all the necessary conclusions drawn from it. If every manager of a government department or of a division of a government department in every gubernia, uyezd, etc., if every Communist nucleus, without losing a moment, asks, is such-and-such an institution, such-and-such a department absolutely indispensable, shall we perish if we suspend it or reduce its activities by nine-tenths and leave no Communists in it at all?—if the posing of this question is followed by speedy and resolute reduction of work and withdrawal of Communists (together with their absolutely reliable assistants among the sympathisers or non-party people), in a very short time we shall have hundreds upon hundreds of persons for work in the political departments of the army, as commissars, etc. And then we shall have a very good chance of defeating Denikin, just as we have defeated the much stronger Kolchak. Work In The Front Zone The front zone in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic has greatly increased in the past few weeks and has undergone an extremely rapid change. This is a harbinger or concomitant of the decisive moment of the war, of its approaching concluding phase. On the one hand, a vast front zone west of the Urals and in the Ural Mountains proper has become our front zone owing to the victories of the Red Army, the disintegration of Kolchak, and the growth of revolution in Kolchakia. On the other hand, an even larger zone near Petrograd and in the South has become a front zone owing to our losses, owing to the immense advance made by the enemy towards Petrograd and the advance from the South into the Ukraine and towards the centre of Russia. Work in the front zone is assuming cardinal importance. In the Cis-Urals area, where the Red Army, is rapidly advancing, there is a natural desire among army workers—commissars, members of political departments, etc.—as well as among local workers and peasants, to settle down in the newly won localities for constructive Soviet work, a desire which is the more natural, the greater the war fatigue and the more distressful the picture of the destruction wrought by Kolchak. But nothing could be more dangerous than to yield to this desire. It would threaten to weaken our offensive, to retard it, and to increase Kolchak’s chances of recovering his strength. It would be a downright crime against the revolution on our part. Under no circumstances must a single extra worker be taken from the Eastern Army for local work![Unless there is urgent need none at all should be taken, but people should be transferred from the central gubernias! ] Under no circumstances can the offensive be weakened! The only chance we have of complete victory is for the entire population of the Urals area, who have experienced the horrors of Kolchak “democracy”, to take part in it to a man, and to continue the offensive into Siberia until the complete victory of the revolution in Siberia. Let organisational work in the Cis-Urals and the Urals area be delayed, let it proceed less intensively, being done by local, young, inexperienced and weak forces alone. We shall not perish from that. But if we weaken the offensive against the Urals and Siberia we shall perish. We must strengthen that offensive with the forces of the insurgent workers in the Urals, with the forces of the Cis-Urals peasants, who have now learned to their cost the meaning of the “constituent” promises of the Menshevik Maisky and the Socialist-Revolutionary Chernov, and the real meaning of these promises, i.e., Kolchak. To weaken the offensive against the Urals and Siberia would be to betray the revolution, to betray the cause of the emancipation of the workers and peasants from the Kolchak yoke. It should be remembered in connection with the work in the front zone which has only just been liberated that the main task there is to make not only the workers, but the peasants as well, put their faith in Soviet power, to explain to them in practice that Soviet power means the power of the workers and peasants, and at once to take the right course, the course adopted by the Party from the experience of twenty months of work. We must not repeat in the Urals the mistakes which were sometimes made in Great Russia and which we are rapidly learning to avoid. In the front zone outside Petrograd and in that vast front zone which has been growing so rapidly and menacingly in the Ukraine and in the South, absolutely everything must be put on a war footing, and all work, all efforts, all thoughts subordinated to the war and only the war. Otherwise it will be impossible to repulse Denikin’s attack. That is clear. And this must be clearly understood and fully put into practice. Incidentally. A feature of Denikin’s army is the large number of officers and Cossacks in it. This is an element which, having no mass force behind it, is extremely likely to engage in swift raids, in gambles, in desperate ventures, with the object of sowing panic and causing destruction for destruction’s sake. In fighting such a foe military discipline and military vigilance of the highest degree are necessary. To be caught napping or to lose one’s head means losing everything. Every responsible Party and Soviet worker must bear this in mind. Military discipline in military and all other matters! Military vigilance and strictness, and firmness in the adoption of all measures of precaution! Attitude Towards Military Experts The vast conspiracy hatched at Krasnaya Gorka and whose purpose was the surrender of Petrograd has again brought forward and with particular emphasis the question of the military experts and of combating counter-revolution in the rear. There can be no doubt that the aggravation of the food and war situation is inevitably stimulating, and will continue to stimulate in the immediate future, still greater efforts by the counter-revolutionaries (in the Petrograd plot there participated the League of Regeneration, Cadets, Mensheviks and Right Socialist-Revolutionaries; the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries also participated, as a separate group, it is true, but they did participate nevertheless). Nor can there be any doubt that the military experts, like the kulaks, the bourgeois intellectuals, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, will in the near future give a bigger proportion of traitors. But it would be an irreparable mistake and unpardonable weakness of character to raise on this account the question of changing the fundamental principles of our army policy. Hundreds and hundreds of military experts are betraying us and will betray us; we will catch them and shoot them, but thousands and tens of thousands of military experts have been working for us systematically and for a long time, and without them we could not have formed the Red Army, which has grown out of the guerrilla force of evil memory, and has been able to score brilliant victories in the East. Experienced people who head our War Department rightly point out that where the Party policy in regard to the military experts and the extirpation of the guerrilla spirit has been adhered to most strictly, where discipline is firmest, where political work among the troops and the work of the commissars is conducted most thoroughly, there, generally speaking, the number of military experts inclined to betray us is the lowest, there the opportunities for those who are so inclined to carry out their designs are the slightest, there we have no laxity in the army, there its organisation and morale are best, and there we have the most victories. The guerrilla spirit, its vestiges, remnants and survivals have been the cause of immeasurably greater misfortune, disintegration, defeats, disasters and losses in men and military equipment in our army and in the Ukrainian army than all the betrayals of the military experts. Our Party Programme, both on the general subject of bourgeois experts, and on the particular problem of one of their varieties, the military experts, has defined the policy of the Communist Party with absolute precision. Our Party is waging and will continue to wage “a relentless struggle against the pseudo-radical but actually ignorant and conceited opinion that the working people are capable of overcoming capitalism and the bourgeois social system without learning from bourgeois specialists, without making use of their services and without undergoing the training of a lengthy period of work side by side with them”. At the same time, of course, the Party does not make the “slightest political concession to this bourgeois section of the population”, the Party suppresses and will continue “ruthlessly to suppress any counter-revolutionary attempts on its part”. Naturally, whenever such an “attempt” is made or becomes more or less probable, its “ruthless suppression” requires other qualities than the deliberateness, the cautiousness of an apprentice, which are demanded for lengthy training, and which the latter inculcates. The contradiction between the attitude of people engaged in the “lengthy period of work side by side” with the military experts, and the attitude of people absorbed in the direct task of “ruthlessly suppressing a counter-revolutionary attempt” of military experts might easily lead, and does lead, to friction and conflict. The same applies to the necessary changes of personnel, the shifting around sometimes of large numbers of military experts which is necessitated by instances of counter-revolutionary “attempts”, and all the more by large-scale conspiracies. We settle, and will continue to settle, such friction and conflicts in the Party way, demanding the same of all the Party organisations and insisting that not the slightest damage to practical work, not the slightest delay in the adoption of essential measures, not a shadow of hesitation in the observance of the established principles of our military policy be tolerated. If some of our Party bodies adopt an incorrect tone towards the military experts (as was recently the case in Petrograd), or if in some cases “criticism” of military experts turns into direct hindrance to the systematic and persistent work of employing them, the Party immediately rectifies, and will rectify, such mistakes. The chief and principal means of rectifying them is to intensify political work in the army and among the mobilised, to improve the work of the commissars in the army, to have more highly qualified commissars, to raise their level, to have them carry out in practice that which the Party Programme demands and which only too often is carried out far too inadequately, i.e., “the concentration of all-round control over the commanders (of the army) in the hands of the working class”. Criticism of the military experts by outsiders, attempts to correct matters by “lightning raids” are too easy, and therefore hopeless and harmful. All those who recognise their political responsibility, who take the defects of our army to heart, let them join its ranks, either as privates or commanders, as political workers or commissars; let each work—every Party member will find a place suited to his abilities—inside the army organisation for its improvement. The Soviet government has long been paying the greatest attention to making it possible for workers, and also peasants, Communists in particular, to master the art of war in all seriousness. This is being done at a number of establishments, institutions and courses, but still far too little is being done. There is still a lot of room here for personal initiative and personal energy. Communists, in particular, should persistently study the handling of machine guns, artillery, armoured vehicles, etc., for here our backwardness is more telling, here the enemy’s superiority, with his larger number of officers, is greater, here it is possible for an unreliable military expert to do grave harm, here the role of the Communist is important in the extreme. The Fight Against Counter-Revolution In The Rear Counter-revolution is raising its head in our rear and in our midst just as it did in July of last year. Counter-revolution has been defeated, but by no means destroyed, and is naturally taking advantage of Denikin’s victories and of the aggravation of the food shortage. And, as always, in the wake of direct and open counter-revolution, in the wake of the Black Hundreds and the Cadets, whose strength lies in their capital, their direct connections with Entente imperialism, and their understanding of the inevitability of dictatorship and their ability to exercise it (on Kolchak lines)—in their wake follow the wavering, spineless Mensheviks, Right Socialist-Revolutionaries and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, who embellish their deeds with words. There should be no illusions on this score! What is the “nutritive medium” which engenders counter-revolutionary activities, outbreaks, conspiracies and so forth we know full well. The medium is the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois intelligentsia, the kulaks in the countryside, and, everywhere, the “non-party” public, as well as the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. We must redouble, we must increase tenfold our watch over this medium. We must multiply tenfold our vigilance, because counter-revolutionary attempts from this quarter are absolutely inevitable, precisely at the present moment and in the near future. For this reason, too, repeated attempts to blow up bridges, to foment strikes, to engage in every kind of espionage and the like, are natural. All precautions of the most intense, systematic, repeated, wholesale and unexpected kind are essential in all centres without exception where the “nutritive medium” of the counter-revolutionaries has the least chance of existing. In regard to the Mensheviks and the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, we must draw a lesson from our most recent experience. Among their “periphery”, among the public which gravitates towards them, there is an undoubted shifting away from Kolchak and Denikin towards Soviet power. We have taken cognisance of this shift, and every time it has assumed any real shape we, on our part, have taken a step to meet it. This policy of ours we shall not change under any circumstances, and generally speaking, there will no doubt be an increase in the number of “migrants” from the type of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism which leans towards Kolchak and Denikin to the type of Menshevism and Socialist-Revolutionarism which leans towards Soviet power. But at the present juncture the petty-bourgeois democrats, headed by the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, spineless and wavering as always, are watching to see which way the wind blows, and are swinging in the direction of the victor, Denikin. This is especially true of the “political leaders” of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries of the Mensheviks (of the type of Martov and Co.), of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries (of the type of Chernov and Co.), and of their “literary groups” in general, whose members, apart from all else, are deeply offended at their political bankruptcy, and for whom hazardous ventures against Soviet power, therefore, have an attraction that is hardly likely to be eradicated. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the words and ideology of their leaders, by their personal integrity or hypocrisy. This is important from the standpoint of their individual biographies. But it is not important from the standpoint of politics, i.e., of the relations between classes, of the relations between millions of people. Martov and Co., “in the name of the Central Committee”, solemnly condemn their “activists” and threaten (eternally threaten!) to expel them from the party. But this by no means does away with the fact that the “activists” are the strongest of all among the Mensheviks, hide behind them, and carry on their work on behalf of Kolchak and Denikin. Volsky and Co. condemn Avksentyev, Chernov and Co., but this does not in the least prevent the latter from being stronger than Volsky, nor does it prevent Chernov from saying, “If it is not we who are to overthrow the Bolsheviks, and not now, then who is, and when?” The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries may “work independently” without any agreement with the reactionaries, with the Chernovs, but actually they are just as much allies of Denikin and pawns in his game as the late Left Socialist-Revolutionary Muravyov, the ex-commander-in-chief, who for “ideological” reasons opened the front to the Czechoslovaks and to Kolchak. Martov, Volsky and Co. fancy themselves “superior” to both contending sides; they fancy themselves capable of creating a “third side”. This desire, even when it is sincere, still remains the illusion of the petty-bourgeois democrat, who to this day, seventy years after 1848, has still not learned the most elementary thing, namely, that in a capitalist environment only the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat is possible, and that no third course can exist. Martov and Co. will evidently die with this illusion. That is their affair. And it is our affair to remember that in practice vacillations on the part of these people are inevitable, today in the direction of Denikin, tomorrow in the direction of the Bolsheviks. And today we must do the task of this day. Our task is to put the question bluntly. What is better? To ferret out, to imprison, sometimes even to shoot hundreds of traitors from among the Cadets, non-party people, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who “come out” (some with arms in hand, others with conspiracies, others still with agitation against mobilisation, like the Menshevik printers and railwaymen, etc.) against Soviet power, in other words, in favour of Denikin ? Or to allow matters to reach such a pass that Kolchak and Denikin are able to slaughter, shoot and flog to death tens of thousands of workers and peasants? The choice is not difficult to make. That is how the question stands, and not otherwise. Whoever has not yet understood this, whoever is capable of whining over the “iniquity” of such a decision, must be given up as hopeless and held up to public ridicule and shame. The Population Must Be Mobilised For War To A Man The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world capital. We can concede the right to use it as a refuge from Kolchak, and the right to live in it generally, only to those who take an active part in the war and help us in every way. Hence our right and our duty to mobilise the whole population for the war to a man, some for army work in the direct meaning of the term, others for subsidiary activities of every kind in aid of the war. To carry this out in full, an ideal organisation is required. And since our government organisation is very far from perfect (which is not in the least surprising in view of its youth, its novelty and the extraordinary difficulties which accompany its development), to attempt at once and on a wide scale anything complete or even very considerable in this sphere would be a most dangerous indulgence in fantastic organisational schemes. But much can be done in a partial way to bring us nearer to this ideal, and the “initiative” shown by our Party workers and Soviet officials in this respect is very, very far from enough. It will suffice here to raise this question and to draw the attention of comrades to it. There is no need to give any specific instructions or proposals. Let us only observe that the petty-bourgeois democrats who stand nearest to the Soviets and who call themselves, by force of habit, socialists—some of the “Left” Mensheviks and the like, for example—are particularly disposed to wax indignant at the ”barbaric”, in their opinion, practice of taking hostages. Let them wax indignant, but unless this is done war can not be waged, and when the danger grows acute the use of this means must be extended and multiplied in every sense. Not infrequently, for instance, Menshevik or yellow printers, higher railway employees or secret profiteers, kulaks, the wealthy sections of the urban (and rural) population and similar elements look upon defence against Kolchak and Denikin with an infinitely criminal and infinitely brazen attitude of indifference which grows into sabotage. Lists of such groups must be drawn up (or they must be compelled themselves to form groups in which each answers for everybody), and they must not only be put to work digging trenches, as is sometimes practised, but assigned to the most diverse and comprehensive duties for material aid to the Red Army. The fields of the Red Army men will be better cultivated, the supply of food, tobacco and other necessities to the Red Army men will be better arranged, the danger to the lives of thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants resulting from a single conspiracy, etc., will be considerably reduced if we employ this method more widely, more comprehensively and more skilfully. “Work In A Revolutionary Way” Summing up what was said above, we arrive at a simple conclusion. What is demanded immediately and in the course of the next few months of all Communists, of all class-conscious workers and peasants, of everyone who does not want to see Kolchak and Denikin win, is an extraordinary accession of energy; what is needed is “work in a revolutionary way”. The starving, exhausted and worn-out Moscow railwaymen, both skilled and unskilled, have for the sake of victory over Kolchak inaugurated “communist subbotniks”—work without pay for several hours a week to continue until victory over Kolchak is complete—and have, moreover, developed unprecedented labour productivity, exceeding the usual productivity many times over; this goes to show that much, very much can still be done. And we must do it. Then we shall win. Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) http://marxists.nigilist.ru/archive/lenin/works/sw/index.htm |
